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The law has rested on a perception of technology that is sometimes
accurate, often inaccurate, and which changes slowly as technology

changes fast.
Ithiel de Sola Pool1
INTRODUCTION

The emergence of computer technology in the late twentieth century
has opened vast new possibilities and presented new challenges to almost
eve 7 social, cultural, commercial, and political institution of modern
life. Computer technology has fostered enormous changes, particularly
in information processing and communications, which in turn change in
important respects the way we experience the world. Most striking, perhaps, is that computers remove some of the limitations of time and place
that the familiar physical world has always imposed .
As virtually every aspect of social life has had to respond to the impact of widely available computer technology, so too has the law. The
greatly enhanced ease of access to, and large-scale reproduction of, legally protectible materials presents new challenges to the law of intellectual property and copyright. The rights of individuals to freedom of
speech, protected by the First Amendment, may collide with the regulations imposed on commercial publishers and distributors when individuals themselves become "publishers" or mass distributors of text, pictures, or other materials. Questions of privacy protection can be raised
by the ease with which large numbers of uninvited strangers can
"invade" an individual's home or presumably personal environment.
The availability and widespread use of computers also present challenges to the criminal law. Computers offer both new ways to commit
old crimes and the means of committing crimes unknown to a pre-digital
justice system. But the distinction between familiar crimes accomplished
by means of new electronic technology, and "new" crimes made possible
only by technology, has been unnecessarily and confusingly blurred by
recent federal computer-crime legislation. Legislators and others apprehensive about the misuse of technology too often have perceived a need
to enact statutes to counteract "computer crimes" 4 that are in fact al-

TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 7 (1983).
2 "The content on the Internet is as diverse as human thought."

ACLU v. Reno,

929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
3 See, e.g., Josh L. Wilson, Jr., Electronic Village: Information Technology Creates
New Space, 6 COMPUTER/L.J. 365, 370 (1985). See generally M. ETHAN KATSH, THE
ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW (1989) (discussing broad changes
in the law resulting from electronic transmission of data).
4 One significant obstacle faced by any researcher into the area of computer crimes
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that such statutes merely prohibit conduct that is already criminal, they
are simply redundant. To the extent that they are drafted in "technologyspecific" language, the pace of technological change and the ingenuity of
computer-literate criminals guarantee that those statutes will be obsolete
almost as soon as they are enacted. To the extent that they focus on

technological means, rather than on the harm caused by a defendant's
conduct, those statutes tend towards overbreadth by sweeping within their
ambit anyone who uses the means regardless of result. To the extent that
computer-specific statutes are enacted by legislators unfamiliar or uncomfortable with technology, such statutes tend to reflect a lack of clarity or
understanding or, sometimes, simply fear. Thus, a "computer-specific"
approach results, too often, in criminal statutes that are unnecessary, imprecise, clumsy, over-inclusive, or ineffective.
State and federal legislatures have been drawn to the idea that new
statutory prohibitions are necessary by an array of sociological and political concerns, including legislators' own technological education and
comfort level .5 In addition to those extra-legal considerations, however,
the nature of the criminal law itself can seem to demand a wholly new
statutory response to computer crime. Specifically, digital technology
presents challenges to two related notions that underlie the criminal law
as it has been traditionally understood: the concept of property and the
importance of physical location.
Much of the criminal law seeks to deter and punish transgressions
against property. A very broad range of criminal statutes-from felonies
is the dearth, indeed the absence, of reliable and comprehensive statistical data sufficient
to provide an accurate profile of the subject. The number of prosecutions for computerrelated crime apparently remains quite small; the number of cases that have gone to trial
is smaller yet; and the number of appellate decisions in the area is such as to leave vast
areas of statutory interpretation and application unresolved. Estimates as to the amount of
computer crime vary so enormously as to make any figure suspect. Apparently no governmental or private agency maintains a reliable compilation of the number of crimes, or
prosecutions, or convictions involving computer-related conduct. This problem stems, in
large part, from the fact that the federal government, and most of the states, have both
computer-specific criminal statutes and statutes of more general application under which
computer-related conduct can, and has been, prosecuted. Another major complicating
factor is the reluctance of targets of such crimes, particularly corporate, governmental,
and other institutional victims, to report publicly either the fact or the extent of intrusions
into sensitive programs and databases. Overriding all of these significant problems is the
protean difficulty of defining a computer crime. The theft of a computer from a retail
store may be defined as a computer crime by some, and as garden-variety theft by others.
Stealing a wallet that contains both cash and an automatic teller machine card with an access code written on its back, and then using the card to obtain additional cash, may or
may not constitute a computer crime.
See Amalia M. Wagner, Comment, The Challenge of Computer-Crime Legislation:
How Should New York Respond?, 33 BuFF. L. REv. 777, 781 n.22 (1984).
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such as burglary or forgery, to misdemeanors such as vandalism by
graffiti-are designed to protect various kinds of property interests. The
notion of property is, of course, central to the definition of those crimes.
Computer-related criminal conduct presents a challenge to the criminal
law, in significant part, precisely because it involves electronic impulses
that cannot be seen, touched, moved, or copied as those terms have traditionally been defined, and that therefore seem to fall outside the idea of
"property" as defined over centuries of Anglo-American jurisprudence.
Computer technology also alters the significance of physical location. While computers can perform a vast array of tasks, almost all of
the legal issues relevant to "computer crime" arise from one category of
computer functions: communications. Computer-related criminal conduct typically involves the accessing, transfer, and/or distribution of information on one computer by means of software operating on another
remote computer. The central characteristic that distinguishes electronic
communications in these situations is remoteness: physical proximity becomes irrelevant.
The crimes of trespass and larceny provide useful illustrations of the
problems posed by computer technology. Typical criminal statutes define
trespass as the unlawful entry onto another's property. 6 Larceny is typically defined as the taking of another's property with the intent to deprive. 7 Central to the definition of both crimes is the idea of property.
With trespass, the property is geographical. A person commits trespass
by physically moving into a specified geographical space. The paradigm
of trespass, descended from centuries-old common law, is the unlawful
entry onto real estate. Larceny too has traditionally been defined in
terms of tangible property. The simplest conception of larceny, again
springing from old common law and the social circumstances from which
it arose, is the unlawful seizing and carrying off of one's neighbor's
sheep. Both of these ancient crimes rest on the notion of property as
physical property: property one can grab and walk off with, property
one can stand on, property that can be fenced off or tied down.
Computers-the machines themselves-are, of course, tangible
property that exists in the familiar physical world. But the interactions
that the machines make possible do not involve tangible property and do
not take place in the familiar physical world. Computer interactions occur, instead, in "cyberspace," the same "place" in which telephone
6 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.05 (McKinney 1995); MODEL PENAL CODE §

221.2 (1980).
7 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.05 (McKinney 1995); MODEL PENAL
CODE §
223.2 (1980).
8 William Gibson coined this now-familiar phrase. Although usually attributed to his

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[27:574

conversations occur. 9 The notion of geographical place is irrelevant to
those interactions. They do not occur "in" a machine, but rather only by
means of the machine. The geographical location of the persons involved
in the interaction is irrelevant: the same operations can be executed on,
or from, any similarly-equipped machine regardless of place. The notion
of physical property is similarly irrelevant. Interactions in cyberspace
consist of electromagnetic impulses, which may be "matter" as understood by a physicist, but do not easily correspond to "property" in the
ordinary sense or as defined by the law.
Perhaps the simplest example of a computer crime is the unauthorized accessing of a computer, and the manipulation or copying of information stored on that computer. Does such an occurrence involve a trespass? In some sense, of course, there has been an unlawful entry onto
the property of another. But "property" is precisely where the application of the law of trespass becomes problematic. The electronic intruder
has not entered the property of anyone, certainly not in the old commonlaw sense of entry onto real estate. If the intruder copies or downloads
information without authorization, has a larceny occurred? The old notion of larceny does not easily fit the situation. If the original data remain stored on the accessed machine, nothing has been "taken" from the
owner: the owner still has exactly what she had prior to the "entry."
And even if our intruder copies the information and then deletes the
original, exactly what has been taken? The intruder has simply caused
the reproduction of a series of electronic impulses-digital ones and zeroes-that can be read and then displayed by another machine. Such a
description is far from the idea of property as typified by a neighbor's
livestock.
When faced with the problematic application of traditional crimes to
the brave new digital world, legislatures typically respond with statutes
aimed specifically at the use of computers and defined in terms of specific
technology. Legislators have tended to view computers as different, and
crimes committed with the use of computer technology as fundamentally
different from crimes committed with other kinds of tools. But other responses are possible and indeed are frequently preferable.
This Article argues that legislatures can respond more effectively to
most computer-related crimes by modifying existing criminal statutes,
rather than by enacting new computer-specific laws. Computers are not
so unique that the criminal law must be rewritten to account for them; innovel NEUROMANCER (1984), it first appeared in his short story Burning Chrome, reprinted in BURNING CHROME (1986).
9 See John Perry Barlow, Coming Into the Country, 34 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE
ACM 19 (March 1991) <http://www.eff.org>. See infra note 15.
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deed, most "computer crimes" correspond quite closely to older crimes,
notably trespass or larceny. Simply by redefining "property," or broadening other statutory language, legislatures can bring "computer crimes"
under those existing statutory prohibitions. Enacting wholly new statutes, aimed solely at crimes committed with the aid of electronic technology, too often produces unnecessary and ineffective legislation. Moreover, a legislative focus on the computer, rather than on the harm caused
by conduct, can lead to the misconceived conclusion that conduct undertaken by means of a computer amounts to a crime, even though analogous
conduct undertaken by other, less high-tech means does not. With few
exceptions, legislatures should focus on results, rather than on the means
employed. If the result warrants a criminal penalty, then a penalty
should be imposed. To a great extent, traditional criminal statutes will
achieve that result. If the result does not warrant a criminal penalty, then
the involvement of a computer should not transform innocent activity into
criminal conduct. 10
Part I of this Article provides a brief history of the emergence and
proliferation of computer technology, including the historical context in
which computer-law issues arise. Part II analyzes the provisions of the
major federal computer-crime statute, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
of 1986.11 Part III presents a critical view of the computer-specific approach reflected in that statute, in other computer-related legislation, and
in prosecutions commenced under other federal statutes. Part IV advocates an alternative approach to computer-crime legislation, arguing that
reliance on traditional criminal statutes of general application is more effective and more legislatively sound.
I.

AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE GOOD OLD DAYS

Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of every

thing.
James Madison

12

Computers were invented in the 1940s, as part of the war effort; but
until the 1960s they were available only to'3a very small number of military, scientific, and university researchers.
Although the idea of comto See Joshua Quittner, Computer Rights: Advocates Worry About Overzealousness in
the Crackdown on Hackers, NEWSDAY, Sept. 4, 1990, at 1.
11 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1995).
12 Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (citing The Report on the Virginia
Resolutions of 1798, in 4 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF 1787,
571 (1876)).
13 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996); see also HOWARD
RHEINOOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY 65-89 (1993) (notable among the many accounts
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puters, and a vague notion of their capabilities, gradually became part of
the cultural landscape, to virtually everyone outside the very small computer community they were enormous, unwieldy number-crunching machines with little relevance to the lives of ordinary people. From the late
1960s to the early 1980s, the community of computer users slowly expanded; more businesses made use of them in office settings, personal
computers became available, and, to a small but growing portion of the
population of the United States, the computer opened an exciting, unexplored, untamed world.
This period in the development of the computer has been analogized
to the opening of the frontier in the American West:
Cyberspace ...has a lot in common with the 19th Century West. It
is vast, unmapped, culturally and legally ambiguous, verbally
terse, ... hard to get around in, and up for grabs. Large institutions
already claim to own the place, but most of the actual natives are
solitary and independent, sometimes to the point of sociopathy. It is,
breeding ground for both outlaws and new ideas
of course, a perfect
14
about liberty.
The comparison is intriguing, illuminating, and appropriate. In its
formative years, the Western frontier, like the electronic frontier, was
populated by knowledgeable and decidedly independent explorers, rugged
individualists with little interest in formalized control structures who
lived instead by their own rough-hewn "code." Much as the legendary
Western pioneers had to develop an array of survival skills and highly
valued the self-sufficiency the frontier demanded, so too electronic explorers had to develop flexible, adaptive, often seat-of-the-pants techniques for surviving in cyberspace. Early Westerners were drawn to the
wildness and openness of the region; they wanted neither themselves nor
the land to be "fenced in," and resented attempts by others to do so.
Quite similarly, one oft-repeated motto of the electronic frontierspeople
was that "information wants to be free;" 5 they resented any effort to restrict access to information, any attempt to fence in the wide-open
of the development and proliferation of computers).
14 John Perry Barlow, Crime and Puzzlement: In Advance of the Law on the Electronic Frontier, 68 WHOLE EARTH REv. 44, 45 (1990). In 1990, Barlow, along with
Mitch Kapor, founder of Lotus Development Corp., founded the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, one of the first advocacy groups concerned with legal issues of the computer
age and in particular the protection of civil liberties in computer-related settings. The organization's on-line site, http://www.eff.org, provides a valuable source of information,
legal and otherwise, pertaining to computer-related issues.
15 Cf. Terri A. Cutrera, Comment, The Constitution in Cyberspace, 60 UMKC L.
REv. 139, 141 (1991): "ITihe 'hacker ethic' . .. postulates that 'access to computers ... should be unlimited and total'; . . . 'all information should be free.'" Id. at
nn.13, 14 (citing Dorothy E. Denning, Concerning Hackers Who Break Into Computer
Systems (Oct. 1990) (paper presented at 13th National Computer Security Conference)).
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reaches of cyberspace. These electronic pioneers felt they had the right,
indeed the duty, to explore every corner of this new territory; but their
unwritten code, the "hacker ethic," prohibited causing damage to any
computer or to information.16
The unwritten code of the Old West may have worked well enough
when the pioneers were few and largely self-sufficient, established settlements virtually non-existent, and the inhabitants willing to abide by the
general strictures of the pioneer ethic. But that loose arrangement became untenable when, on the one hand, settlers arrived to start farms,
establish towns and businesses, and generally bring civilization to the
frontier, and on the other, when outlaws arrived to plunder these assets
in the absence of visible law-enforcement mechanisms.
Similarly, the electronic frontier became increasingly populated by
persons who neither had nor wanted to develop extensive technological
expertise; they wanted an easy-to-use, efficient tool without having to
battle a challenging, cantankerous environment; they wanted to set up
businesses and start "towns"-bulletin boards, chat lines, newsgroupsand wanted some security and predictability for their forays into the territory. And "outlaws" appeared, who did not subscribe to the hacker ethic
of doing no damage, but instead wanted to take advantage of the absence
of external controls to plunder the growing abundance of on-line assets.
As the mythical Wild West inevitably came under the rule of law
and order, so too the electronic frontier could not have continued forever
by relying only on informal self-policing by the on-line community.
Doing business electronically required the same kinds of law enforcement
as did business in the three-dimensional world. The digital world thus
poses legal and social issues that have surfaced in other contexts throughout American history: the tension between freedom of individual conduct
and the need for order and control; the impulse towards openness, freedom of speech and public access in conflict with the need for security and
privacy; the tendency towards a freewheeling, government-off-our backs,
slightly anarchic democracy versus the perceived need for regulation to
make the digital world safer and more predictable.
The age of relative innocence in cyberspace ended during the 1980s;
the wide-open electronic frontier had to be made safe for tamer and, significantly, commercial17 pursuits, and law enforcement therefore had to
See id.
17 Hacking helped energize both the personal computer industry and
the software industry. Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak, whose creation of the Apple computer made the machine accessible to average people, gained most
of their knowledge from hacking. The same holds true for Bill Gates,
whose fascination with software eventually led to the creation of Microsoft
Corp., now the world's leading producer of operating programs for IBM
16
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make its presence felt. Several notable events marked the transition from
frontier to marketplace during this period. The first federal computercrime legislation was proposed in 1979;'8 Congress enacted the first such
statute, a rather primitive model, in 1984; 19 in 1986, Congress revised
the statute" to set up a more comprehensive legal framework for the
prosecution of computer crimes. In 1983, the movie "War Games" was
released, providing a point of cultural reference regarding the dangers of
computers and their users; that reference, perhaps like stories of legendary gunslingers, continues to appear in accounts of real incidents. Serious, and potentially serious, incidents of theft by computer increased
significantly. And in 1990, the first massive federal law-enforcement action, Operation Sun Devil, took place.
The mission of Operation Sun Devil was to combat crime in cyberspace; in particular, it focused on persons who made a practice of
"trespassing" by accessing information without authorization. Many of
those targeted by the operation 1 were no more than hackers, or, if one
prefers, pioneers:
many of them subscribed to the notion that
"information wants to be free," and that accessing information, without
causing damage, economic or otherwise, was natural behavior in the
electronic landscape. Operation Sun Devil was a coordinated effort involving the Federal Secret Service, numerous local law enforcement
agencies, and the security resources of MCI, Sprint, the regional Bell
companies, American Express, and other companies heavily invested in
on-line business activity.
Considerable evidence, in fact, suggests that
the telecommunications industry was the driving force behind the operation.23 It is not surprising that commercial entities trying to do business

personal computers. But with the increasing dependence of business and
society upon electronic networks, the incursions of hackers became less
and less tolerable.
Willie Schatz, The Terminal Men: Crackdown on the 'Legion of Doom' Ends an Era for
Computer Hackers, WASH. POST, June 24, 1990, at HI.

I See infra note 32.

19 See infra Part
II.
20 See infra Part II.
21 See infra note 24 et seq.

22 See Barlow, supra note 14, at 49.
23 See BRUCE STERuNG, THE HACKER CRACKDOWN 1-39 (1992) (examining in detail
the central role of the telecommunications industry, and in particular of AT&T and the
Bell regional companies, in computer-related law enforcement generally and in Operation
Sun Devil in particular); see also Mark Lewyn & Evan I. Schwartz, Why the "Legion of
Doom" Has Little Fear of the Feds, Bus. WEEK, Apr. 15, 1991, at 31 (quoting AT&T's

corporate security manager to the effect that, with regard to one indictment stemming
from an Operation Sun Devil raid, without AT&T's help, the government "would have
had no case").
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in the electronic "neighborhood" wanted the law to be a strong and visible presence.
Several analogies seem inescapable in describing the sweep of Operation Sun Devil. As in the Old West of legend, it was time to clean up
the town so that decent folk-shopkeepers-could carry on their business
without having to put up with untamed, peculiar, and unpredictable rowdies; the solution was to jail those who acted in untamed, peculiar, or
rowdy fashion, whether or not they caused actual harm. To suggest a
more recent urban analogy, it was time to get the gangs off the streets, so
that law-abiding citizens could conduct their affairs in safety; the solution
was to jail those who flaunted gang colors, or hung out on the street corner, or stayed out too late making too much noise, whether or not they
caused actual harm.
Operation Sun Devil first came to public attention in January 1990,
only days after the AT&T "crash," 2 4 with the arrests of several persons
well-known in the hacker "underground," and then struck most visibly
on May 8, 1990, with the execution of twenty-eight search warrants in
fourteen cities across the country. 25 Secret Service agents carried out
raids, often at gunpoint, confiscated approximately forty computer systems and other high-tech tools from homes and businesses, 2 6 seized some
23,000 computer disks 27 and disrupted the digital lives of their targets.
The operation represented an unmistakable statement by law enforcement
officials that as far as the law was concerned the frontier was closed:
they would prosecute not only serious computer crimes, but also the mere
disregarding of property lines.
The operation was an overreaction. 28 None of the targets were
shown to have engaged in serious criminal activity, or to have caused any
actual harm. The number of reported prosecutions was no more than

24 On January 15, 1990, Martin Luther King, Jr. Day, AT&T's long-distance telephone system "crashed," disrupting service for millions of users. Although AT&T officials acknowledged that the massive outage resulted from an internal computer system
error, speculation surfaced about the possibility of the involvement of outside hackers.

See STERLING, supra note 23, at 32-39. Sterling argues that the crash gave law enforcement and industry officials a "cause celebre" to justify the implementation of Operation

Sun Devil. See id. at 1-39.
25 See John Markoff, Drive to Counter Computer Crime Aims at Invaders, N.Y.
TIMES, June 3, 1990, at 1.

26 The items seized included answering machines and telephones. See Barlow, supra

note 14, at 55-56; STERLING, supra note 23, at 147-55.
27 See Markoff, supra note 25.

28 " Every time there is a perceived crisis, law-enforcement agencies and legislators
overreact, and usually due process and civil liberties suffer."

wards (D-Calif.)).

Id. (quoting Rep. Don Ed-
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seven, 29 a very small number given the size of the operation. The major
tangible consequence of the operation was the seizure of equipment and
data, and the shutting down of numerous bulletin boards. Most important was the sending of the clear message that "the law has come to cyberspace.
If the early years in cyberspace were marked by lawlessness, then a major law-enforcement operation, even an overly harsh and
punitive operation, may seem an inevitable response. The pendulum had
swung too far in the direction of unrestricted freedom; the time had come
to impose order and predictability.
Seen in this light, computers do not represent something entirely
new in the legal world; the electronic domain is, instead, a new arena in
which the same tensions that have always informed the law, and the
criminal law in particular, must be played out.
The law of computer crime thus reflects, in a new technological environment, conflicts that have arisen in many other, more traditional settings. In the 1990s, the challenge is to find an acceptable, constitutional
balance between encouraging and utilizing the freedom of cyberspace and
preventing its exploitation for criminal purposes.
II.

THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE: THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND

ABUSE ACT

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)3 1 was the first federal
statute aimed specifically at computer crimes. 32 Originally enacted in
1984, 33 the statute provided specific authority for the prosecution of cer34
tain crimes accomplished by means of a computer. Reporting the Act
See Cutrera, supra note 15, at 153.
30 See Barlow, supra note 14, at 55.
31 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1995).
29

32

Senator Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut introduced the first proposed computer-

specific criminal statute, the Federal Computer Systems Protection Act, in Congress in
1977 as S. 1766, 95th Cong. (1977); subsequently revised and introduced as S. 240, 96th
Cong. (1979). See John Roddy, The Federal Computer Systems Protection Act, 7
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 343 (1979); Joseph B. Tompkins, Jr. & Linda A.
Mar, The 1984 Federal Computer Crime Statute: A PartialAnswer to a Pervasive Problem, 6 CoMPUTERIL.J. 459 (1986); Darryl C. Wilson, Viewing Computer Crime: Where
Does the Systems ErrorReally Exist?, 11 CoMPuTERIL.J. 265, 268 (1991). The proposed
statute would have criminalized the "manipulation or attempted manipulation" of any
computer owned or operated by the United States, certain financial institutions, and entities affecting interstate commerce, for the purpose of "devising or executing any scheme
or artifice to defraud," or of "obtaining money, property, or services . . . by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises...
S".240, 96th Cong.
(1979).
Enacted as The Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
Pub. L. No. 98-473.
34 See Pub. L. No. 98-473.
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to the full House of Representatives, the House Committee on the Judiciary noted that, "[t]here is no specific Federal legislation in the area of
computer crime. Any enforcement action in response to computer-related
crime must rely on statutory restrictions that were designed for other offenses, such as mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341) or wire fraud (18 U.S.C. §
1343) statutes.", 35 Concluding that reliance on such statutes would frus36
trate prosecutors and allow computer-related crimes to go unpunished,
the Committee recommended, and Congress enacted, § 1030 as a
"computer-specific" criminal statute. In so doing, the lawmakers rejected the possibility of amending existing legislation and opted instead to
attack this "new" kind of criminal conduct by enacting a new, particularized kind of criminal statute.
The CFAA 37 prohibits a variety of acts involving the use of computers. However, with the partial exception of one section, all six sections
of the CFAA focus on unauthorized computer access which leads to, or
furthers, some additional criminal end.
Paragraph (a)(1) prohibits obtaining information "that has been determined by the United States government, pursuant to executive order or
statute, to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons
of national defense or foreign relations, or any restricted data, as defined
in . . . the Atomic Energy Act of 1954," when that information is obtained by gaining knowingly unauthorized access to a computer, and
when the person who obtains that information has the "intent or reason to
believe that such information so obtained is to be used to the injury of the
United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation." Thus, in essence, section (a)(1) prohibits obtaining "what generically is considered
to be classified information.,39
Paragraph (a)(2) provides for punishment of
whoever intentionally accesses a computer without authorization, or
exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains information contained

in a financial record of a financial institution or of a card issuer as
defined in § 1602(n) of Title 15, or contained in a file of a consumer
35 H.R. REP. No. 98-984 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3691.
36 See id. at 3691-92.
37 As detailed infra, the statute was amended in 1986 and again in
1994. Of the current statute's six provisions, three remain unchanged or nearly so from the 1984 enactment. Two were added in 1986; one section was added by the 1994 amendments. For a
description and analysis of the 1984 act, see Glenn D. Baker, Trespassers Wll Be Prosecuted: Computer Crime in the 1990s, 12 CoMptuTER/L.J. 61 (1993). See also Tompkins
& Mar, supra note 32.
38 See § 1030(a)(3) (discussed infra).
39 H.R. REP. No. 98-894 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689,
3706.
40 Defined in § 1030(e).
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reporting agency on a consumer, as such terms are defined in the Fair

Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. § 1681 etseq.).
Like paragraph (a)(1), this provision does not penalize simply accessing a
computer, but only obtaining certain information by means of such access. The statute prohibits the act of obtaining such information without
authorization, but its language is explicitly limited to the obtaining of information by means of unauthorized access to a computer.
Paragraph (a)(3) is the only provision of § 1030 which, at least in
part, prohibits simple unauthorized access. That section prohibits intentional unauthorized access of any computer that is "exclusively for the
use of the Government of the United States." It also prohibits unauthorized access of any computer used not exclusively by the federal government, but only when such access "adversely affects the use of the Government's operation of such computer." Thus, a hacker's accessing of a
computer used exclusively by the government would itself be a federal
crime. If that computer is shared by the federal government and some
other entity, however, the access is criminal only if it "adversely affects" 4 1 the government's use. The first part of paragraph (a)(3), the
"trespass" provision, prohibits "entry" into a computer. As such, it is
the only provision of federal law that criminalizes a result possible only
with the use of a computer.
Paragraph (a)(4) of the CFAA punishes fraud by computer. Despite
the title of the statute, this is the only subsection that directly addresses
fraudulent conduct. Conviction under this provision requires proof that a
defendant actually obtained "anything of value," acted with intent to defraud, and accessed a government computer as part of the fraudulent
scheme.
Paragraph (a)(5), as amended in 1994, is the "virus statute." That
section prohibits the unauthorized transmission, by means of a computer
used in interstate commerce or communications, of "a program, information, code or command" that causes loss or damage of the value of
$1000 or more, or that "modifies or impairs, or potentially modifies or
impairs, the medical examination, medical diagnosis, medical treatment,
or medical care" of any individual. If the transmission is accomplished
with intent to cause damage or to "withhold or deny" use of a computer,
the conduct amounts to a felony; if done with reckless disregard, it is a
misdemeanor.
The 1994 amendment completely revised the previous section (a)(5),
which itself had been added to the CFAA in 1986. The 1986 Act focused
41 The 1984 statute referred only to the "affecting" of a government computer, language that was criticized as overly broad and vague. See infra note 109.
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on actions stemming from unauthorized access of a "federal interest
computer." As with virtually all of the provisions of the CFAA, this
section did not prohibit simple unauthorized access. Instead, (a)(5) prohibited unauthorized access only when it resulted in the alteration, damage, or destruction of information in a federal interest computer that
caused loss of value of $1000, or in the alteration, damage, or destruction of certain medical information 42 located in a federal interest computer; or when it prevented authorized use of that computer and thereby
either caused the loss of value over $1000 or the modification or impairment of medical information.
The final substantive provision of the CFAA, § 1030(a)(6), imposes
liability upon whoever "knowingly and with intent to defraud traffics (as
defined in § 1029) in any password or similar information through which
a computer may be accessed without authorization." This subsection is
"aimed at penalizing conduct associated with 'pirate bulletin boards'
where passwords are displayed that permit unauthorized access to others'
computers.
While Congress's concern with "trafficking" in passwords is related to other concerns addressed in § 1030, this provision
does not directly punish unauthorized access nor, despite the title of §
1030, does it punish fraud.
The only reported appellate decision interpreting § 1030 arose under
subsection (a)(5). 44 In United States v. Morris," the court upheld a
conviction under the portion of that section which prohibited intentionally
accessing "federal interest computers" without authorization and thereby
damaging or preventing authorized use of those computers, causing a loss
of $1000 or more. The defendant, a computer-science graduate student
and the son of a computer security expert at the National Security Administration, had a particular interest in the security of computer networks and had identified several "security defects" 46 in the nationwide
Internet network.4 7 Morris developed and then released onto the Internet

42 Defined in the same language as the "medical"

provision of the current §
1030(a)(5)(B).
43 S. REP. No. 99-432 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2490.
44 Congress substantially amended paragraph (a)(5) in 1994. See infra note
56 and
accompanying text.
45 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991).

46 Id. at 505.

47 The Internet was described by the Morris court as "a group
of national networks
that connect university, governmental, and military computers around the country. The

network permits communications and transfer of information between computers on the
network."

Id. The court's limited description of the Internet was already somewhat out-

dated in 1991.
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a "worm,

" 48
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a program designed to travel from one computer to another

by exploiting the security lapses he had uncovered.4 9

Morris was convicted under § 1030(a)(5), for intentionally accessing
a "federal interest computer" without authorization, and thereby damaging or preventing the authorized use of that computer. On appeal to the
Second Circuit, Morris raised two issues of statutory construction, both
matters of first impression under the CFAA: (1) whether the statute re-

quired proof not merely of intent to gain access, but of intent to damage
or prevent authorized use, and (2) what evidence would establish "access

without authorization" within the meaning of the statute. 50

The intent issue arose from the ambiguous language of the statute:
(a)(5) penalized one who "intentionally accesses ... and by means
of ... such conduct ... damages ... or prevents authorized use." The
question on appeal was whether "intentionally" applied merely to the access or to the results of that access. The issue was crucial here, as in
48 As the Morris court explained, "In the colorful argot of computers ... a 'worm'
is
a program that travels from one computer to another but does not attach itself to the operating system of the computer it 'infects.' It differs from a 'virus,' which is also a migrating program, but one that attaches itself to the operating system of any computer it
enters and can infect any other computer that uses files from the infected computer." Id.
n.1. Interestingly, Morris himself referred to the program as a virus, KATIE HAFNER &
JOHN MARKOFF, CYBERPUNK: OUTLAWS AND HACKERS ON THE COMPUTER FRONTIER 321

(1991); but the repeated use of the term "worm" by the media, by "expert" commentators, and ultimately by the court, caused Morris's program to be dubbed indelibly "the
Internet worm."
49 Morris released the worm on the evening of November 2, 1988, from a computer
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He had designed the program to move
from one computer to another at a controlled rate and to "occupy little computer operation time, and thus not interfere with normal use of the computers." Morris, 928 F.2d at
505-06. However, Morris miscalculated both the rate at which the program would spread
and its capacity for accumulating multiple copies of itself on a single computer. See
HAFNER & MARKOFF, supra note 48, at 303, 339. The worm replicated itself so quickly
that "many machines at locations around the country either crashed or became
'catatonic.'" Morris, 928 F.2d at 506. When Morris realized, later that night, that the
worm had reproduced on this unforeseen scale, he attempted to send instructions for
"killing" the worm; but the network was so clogged by the worm that the messages failed
to arrive in timely fashion. See id. During the hours after the worm's release, computer
operators and programmers at universities and government facilities watched in horrorand fascination- as their machines became inoperable. Presented with this unprecedented challenge, programmers succeeded quickly in isolating the worm, "decompiling"
its code, and ultimately killing it. See HAFNER & MARKOFF, supra note 48, at 258. No
data were lost from any computer; no files were "stolen;" Morris neither obtained nor
sought to obtain anything. Nevertheless, the value of the computer "down" time was
considerable. See Morris, 928 F.2d at 506. More important than any actual damage, or
even inconvenience, the incident was experienced by the computer community, and was
presented in the popular media, as a dramatic illustration of the vulnerability of computers
and computer networks. See HAFNER & MARKOFF, supra note 48, at 312-13.
so See Morris, 928 F.2d at 504.
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many other computer-related prosecutions, because the evidence clearly
established that Morris intended no damage. His intent was instead "to
demonstrate the inadequacies of current security measures on computer
networks." 5 1 Morris regarded the exercise as a game, a challenge to his
technological prowess, and a means of improving network security by
pointing out its weaknesses. 52 The court, relying heavily on legislative
history as well as the language of the statute itself, held that proof of intentional access was sufficient to establish liability. 53 The court held
damage, in effect, to be a strict-liability element of (a)(5). s4 The 1994
amendments to (a)(5), enacted in substantial part as a response to this incident and the threat it was perceived to represent (although not as a response to the decision actually rendered in the case), significantly altered
the law on this point. As amended, the statute no longer requires proof
of "intentional access," but does require proof of scienter as to damage
or denial of authorized use. Liability now is established by evidence that
the defendant without authorization "knowingly" caused the transmission
of a program, with intent to damage or deny use of a computer or network, 55 or with reckless disregard of the substantial and unjustifiable risk
of doing so. 56 Under the 1994 statute, ironically, Morris would have
been guilty at most of a misdemeanor, rather than the felony of which he
was convicted.
The statutory meaning of "access without authorization" was a significant appellate issue because, as the court noted, Morris was authorized to use computers at Cornell, Harvard, and Berkeley, all of which
were on the Internet. As a result, Morris was authorized to communicate
with other computers on the network, at least for some purposes. 57 Because it was undisputed that he was authorized to access the network,
Morris argued that "his conduct constituted, at most, 'exceeding authorized access,' rather than the 'unauthorized access' that [(a)(5)] pun51 Id. at 505.
52 Such "demonstrations" had been typical of the computer community since computers first became available, and comprised an important tool for improving performance
and security. See HAFNER & MARKOFF, supra note 48, at 266-67, 280, 337; Anne W.
Branscomb, Rogue Computer Programs and Computer Rogues: Tailoring the Punishment to Fit the Crime, 16 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH. L.J. 1 (1990). Morris's father and

his colleagues had engaged in many such "demonstrations" in the infancy of the computer age. See HAFNER & MARKOFF, supra note 48, at 266-67, 280. The manager of the
Berkeley computer facility testified at trial that the network was more secure as a result of

Morris's "demonstration."
53
54
55
56

See id. at 335.

See Morris, 928 F.2d at 506-09.

See id. at 509.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (1995).

See § 1030(a)(5)(B).
57 See Morris, 928 F.2d at 509.
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ishes, '' 5 8 an argument that would appear to have considerable force. The
court held, however, that because Morris used certain features in ways
unrelated to their intended functions, 59 his conduct amounted to "access
60
without authorization." This dubious reasoning was accompanied by a
more forceful, and certainly more widely applicable, rationale. The Second Circuit cited with approval the trial court's reasoning that the worm
was designed to spread to other computers at which he had no account
and no authority to gain access to computers at which he had no account
by guessing their passwords. Accordingly, the evidence did support the
jury's conclusion that defendant accessed without authority as opposed to
61
merely exceeding the scope of his authority.
Morris was authorized to enter the network, but he did not thereby
have authority to enter every computer connected to that system. He had
gained 62access without authorization, and had thus properly been found
guilty.

The Second Circuit's opinion in Morris remains the only reported
appellate decision to date under § 1030. While the 1994 amendments to
the CFAA substantially modified and clarified the law regarding intent to
cause damage, the decision retains a unique place in the developing law
of computer crime.
III. THE COMPUTER-SPECIFIC APPROACH
The approach adopted by federal lawmakers and most state legislatures has been to enact statutes aimed specifically at criminal conduct that
involves the use of computers, such as computer-specific criminal statutes. This approach proceeds from the view that criminal conduct accomplished with the use of a computer is inherently different from con5 Id.
59 See id. at 510.
60 The statute prohibited unauthorized access, not the creative use of computer
programs.
61 Morris, 928 F.2d at 510.
62 It was undisputed that Morris had no intent to cause damage to any computer, and
that he neither gained nor sought to gain anything of value for himself. His crime was his
unauthorized access, coupled with the unforeseen and unintended "crashing" of numerous computers. Had he correctly calculated the rate of the worm's reproduction, and had
the worm's presence been discovered only by a few observant systems managers, he
would have committed no crime at all under the 1986 statute. The lack of his intent to
cause harm probably explains the relative leniency of the sentence imposed. See Brenda
Nelson, Straining the Capacity of the Law: The Idea of Computer Crime in the Age of the
Computer Worm, 11 CoMPuTER/L.J. 299, 308 (1991); HAFNER & MARKOFF, supra note

48, at 345-46. Although Morris's violation was punishable by imprisonment of up to five
years under § 1030(c)(3)(A), he was sentenced instead to probation, community service,
and a fine.
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duct accomplished by other means; and therefore criminal statutes of
general application inadequately address computer-related crime. However, legislative action premised on that view leads to the enactment of
statutes that are unnecessary and ineffective, and the criminalization of
conduct that, if done without a computer, would not be criminal.
A.

The Rationale

Congress's rationale in enacting the computer-specific CFAA is
amply documented in the legislative history. The 1984 House Judiciary
Committee Report noted that "[t]here is no specific Federal legislation in
the area of computer crimes. Any enforcement action in response to
computer-related crime must rely on statutory restrictions that were designed for other offenses .... ,, 63 Similarly, the Senate Report on the
1986 amendments 64 stated that prior to 1984, "[t]he proliferation of computers and computer data has spread before the nation's criminals a vast
array of property that, in many cases, is wholly unprotected against
crime.
Both reports thus reflect the view that computer-related criminal conduct is inherently different from other criminal conduct, that
crimes involving the use of a computer comprise an entirely new category
of criminal conduct, and therefore that "non-computer-specific" criminal
statutes are inadequate to combat computer-related crime. The same con66
cern was voiced with regard to the earlier proposed legislation:
"Federl prosecutors have been handicapped because they have had to
construct their cases
on laws that did not envision the technical aspects of
67
computer crime.
To illustrate this concern, the House Report cited United States v.
Seidlitz, one of the earliest computer-related prosecutions. Seidlitz had
designed a communications software program for a federal agency; he
subsequently resigned his job. Several months later, he was detected accessing his former employer's computer in Maryland by modem from his
own office in Virginia, and downloading restricted information about that
program. Because no computer-specific federal statute existed, the jury
convicted Seidlitz of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
That statute prohibited, among other things, transmission by wire
communication of any "writings, signs, signals, pictures or sounds" for
63 H.R. REP. No. 98-894 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.

64 See S. REP. No. 99-432 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
written to accompany both the House and Senate bills.
65 Id. at 2480.
66 See S. 240, 96th Cong. (1979).
67 125 CONG. REc. H710 (January 23, 1979).
68 589 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1978).

3689.
2479, which was
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the purpose of executing a scheme to defraud or to obtain money or
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses or representations."
Seidlitz's use of another employee's user access code 69 constituted the
"false or fraudulent pretenses or representations" prohibited by the statute. His use of telephone lines to gain access to the system and his typing of computer commands were so obviously sufficient to constitute
"transmi[ssion] by means of wire communication" of "writings, signs,
[or] signals," that no issue was raised on appeal with regard to these
elements of the statute. Moreover, no question was raised even as to
whether the electronic information that Seidlitz downloaded amounted to
"property" within the meaning of § 1343. In short, the case presented
no substantial legal questions as to the applicability of the wire-fraud
statute to the computer setting. Seidlitz was convicted, and his conviction upheld.
Despite the fact that § 1343 had proven adequate to address
Seidlitz's conduct, the House Report explicitly pointed to Seidlitz as an
example of the need for computer-specific legislation. In explaining why
Seidlitz demonstrated that need, the Report noted the Justice Department's opinion that "there would have been no basis for Federal prosecution" had the defendant not accessed the computer using interstate teleThe Report made much the same point as to the only other
phone lines.
example cited, United States v. Langevin. 71 According to the Report, the
defendant, a financial analyst, used an employee's password to access by
telephone and modem financial information from a computer at the Federal Reserve Board. 72 The defendant was convicted under § 1343 but,
the Report noted, there would have been no conviction had his access
calls not crossed state lines.7 3 The clear thrust of the Report is that but
for the happenstance of interstate phone access calls, neither of these incidents would have constituted a crime; therefore a technology-specific
statute was necessary.

69 Described unblinkingly by the court as "the user's personal initials."

See id. at

153-54 n.2. The science of computer security was then in its infancy.
70 See H.R. REP. No. 98-894 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3692.
71 See generally H.R. REP. No. 98-894 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3689, 3692 (discussing Langevin, an unpublished decision).
72 See also Jonathan Fuerbringer, Details on Fed Data Theft, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12,
1983 at D1; Al Kamen, Former Fed Aide Pleads Guilty to Tapping Files, WASH. POST,
Jan. 12, 1983 at F6. Both newspapers reported that, following this incident, the Federal
Reserve Board had altered its computer security system, so that "access from the outside
is no longer possible." Thus, no one would be able to repeat Langevin's crime.
73 See H.R. REP. No. 98-894 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3692.
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Problems with the Computer-SpecificApproach
1. Redundancy

The CFAA, and indeed most computer-specific legislation, is duplicative of existing criminal statutes.
The two cases cited in support of the CFAA, Seidlitz and
Langevin,74 could have been prosecuted under a number of federal statutes that were in effect prior to 1984 and that were not computer-specific.
By using the password of a federal employee to gain access to the Federal
Reserve computer, Langevin could well be described as having "falsely
assume[d] or pretend[ed] to be an officer or employee of the United
States ... (and thereby) demand[ed] or obtain[ed] any . . . thing of
value," a felony under 18 U.S.C. § 912. The same might be said of
Seidlitz, because he used the access code of an employee assigned directly to a project of a federal agency.
Both might have been convicted of felonies under 18 U.S.C. §
1001, which punishes anyone who, "in any matter within the jurisdiction
of ...the United States, knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or
covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any
false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or
uses any false writing or document. . . ." Langevin, arguably, could
have been convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1005 for making a "false entry in
any book, report or statement of [any Federal Reserve] bank," or under
18 U.S.C. § 1344 for executing or attempting to execute a scheme
fraudulently to "obtain any . . . property owned by, or under the custody
or control of, a financial institution." Both Seidlitz and Langevin might
have been criminally liable for theft of government property under 18
U.S.C. § 641, which prohibits the embezzlement or knowing conversion
of "any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the United
States ...or any property made ... under contract for the United
States."
These cases do not provide the asserted support for the conclusion
that enactment of computer-specific legislation was, or is, the only way
to combat computer-related crime. Seidlitz and Langevin were successfully prosecuted under other federal statutes, and could have been prosecuted under any of several others.75
74 See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying
text.

75 Moreover, the statute that was enacted, in part on the strength of those
cases, does
not and cannot reach every computer-related crime. Federal jurisdiction under § 1030 is
triggered only by conduct that involves some specified federal interest. The 1986 Senate
Report accompanying the amendments to the CFAA explicitly notes the Judiciary Committee's rejection of the idea that "Congress should enact as sweeping a Federal statute as
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Section (a)(1) of the CFAA prohibits the unauthorized use of a computer to obtain classified information.7 6 Federal law prohibited obtaining
such protected or restricted data, whether by use of a computer or otherwise, even before 1984. Under 18 U.S.C. § 793, it is a crime for any
person "for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national
defense with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used
to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation," to copy, take, make, or obtain any "sketch, photograph, . . . map, . . . document, writing, or note of anything connected
with the national defense. " 77 This statute proscribes a wide range of activities designed to obtain classified or defense-related information, and at
the same time proscribes obtaining or attempting to obtain "anything
connected with the national defense." It therefore encompasses the more
specific conduct prohibited by § 1030(a)(1) (accessing a computer) and
the more specific result (obtaining restricted "information"). Moreover
both statutes prohibit virtually the same criminal intent and purpose.
Indeed, in its report on the 1984 version of (a)(1), the Judiciary Committee specifically noted that the language of that provision 79 had been altered to conform with existing espionage laws.8 °
Thus, these two federal statutes seek to prohibit precisely the same
evil: obtaining national-defense information with the intent that that information be used against the interests of the United States. One of those
statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 793, attacks that evil by focusing on the act of obtaining information; the other, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1), does so by focuspossible so that no computer crime is potentially uncovered.

The Committee... prefers

instead to limit Federal jurisdiction over computer crime to those cases in which there is a
compelling Federal interest, i.e., where computers of the Federal Government or certain
financial institutions are involved, or where the crime itself is interstate in nature." S.
REP. No. 99-432 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2482. It is not the use
of a computer per se that triggers federal jurisdiction over "computer crimes," but the
presence of some "compelling federal interest," a circumstance common to all federal
criminal jurisdiction. Thus, the statute presents the same jurisdictional limitations that
Congress found to be fatal flaws in the wire fraud and other non-computer-specific statutes.
76 See supra note 39 and accompanying
text.
77 18 U.S.C. § 793 (1995). Also prohibited is a host of other
activities undertaken

for the same purpose. See id.
78 "Whoever, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense, with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the injury of
the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation . . .. "
§ 793.

"Whoever,

...

by means of [accessing a computer] obtains [restricted national-defense]

information, with the intent or reason to believe that such information so obtained is to be

used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation."
U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1) (1995).
79 Designated at that time as 18 U.S.C. §
1030(a)(2).
80 See H.R. REP. No. 98-894 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3707.
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ing on one specific manner of obtaining the information. Thus, any potentially criminal conduct prohibited by § 1030(a)(1) would concomitantly be prohibited by § 793; thus, the proscriptions of § 1030(a)(1) are
simply superfluous.
No reported prosecutions have been commenced under the provi-s

sions of (a)(1), even though at least potential violations have occurred, 8
thus suggesting that the statute may be unnecessary to combat computer-

related espionage.
Indeed, the only reported "espionage" case involving the unauthorized use of computers was prosecuted under § 793, the much older, pre-

electronic espionage statute,8 2 and not under § 1030(a)(1).

In 1989, a

federal grand jury in San Jose, California, indicted Kevin Poulsen on
numerous charges of computer-related criminal activity. A superseding
indictment, filed in 1992, added a count charging Poulsen with

"gathering of defense information," under 18 U.S.C. § 793(e), arising

from his possession of computer tapes containing United States Air Force
Air Tasking Orders.8 3 The indictment alleged that Poulsen obtained ac81In

May

1994,

British authorities arrested a

16-year-old hacker (known

as

"Datastream") who had gained access to numerous Pentagon computers in the United
States and abroad, including more than 150 intrusions into the U.S. Air Force "superlab"
in Rome, New York; he had obtained access, inter alia, to files containing confidential

U.S. reports regarding nuclear inspections in North Korea. He was also reported to have
gained access to "top secret files on ballistic weapons research." Nick Hopkins, War
Games Boy, 16, DAILY MAIL, Jan. 3, 1995, at 27. An Air Force spokesman, however,
stated that "there was nothing confidential, nothing classified on the computers." British
Teen-Ager Tapped U.S. Defense Computers, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 9, 1995, at 3A. He
was charged under the British Computer Misuse Act, but not under § 1030 or any other
U.S. law, despite the fact that U.S. law enforcement agencies, including the FBI and the
Air Force Office of Special Investigations, had been probing the "attack" for months and
succeeded in tracking down his address. See Carl Weiser, Details Unfold on Hacking of
Air Force Computers, GANNETr NEws SERV., May 17, 1995.
In an apparently separate episode, officials of the Department of Defense reported
ongoing computer intrusions in 1994 in which hackers "stole, altered, and erased records, and ...

obtained access codes to over 100,000 computer accounts," including ac-

counts at the Pentagon's unclassified military network. See Bob Brewin and Elizabeth
Sikorowsky, Hackers Storm DOD Nets, FED. COMPUTER WK., July 11, 1994, at 1; Pentagon Pirates Remain Untraced, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, July 22, 1994, at A16. No
prosecutions have been reported in connection with these intrusions. The actual extent of
these intrusions, and the damage, if any, that they caused was the subject of wildly varying published accounts. Newspaper accounts published on the same day cited Pentagon
officials as saying that hackers had not endangered vital defense information, that the
"command and control of the Defense Department is in no danger." Hackers Keep Eyes
on Defense, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEws, July 22, 1994, at 46A. The intruders had taken
over whole defense systems and were affecting the defense department's military readi-

ness, and that "estimating exactly the extent of the intruder activity is very difficult."
Hackers Elude Pentagon, Tap Into Files, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 22, 1994, at A1O.
82 Originally enacted in 1917.
83 See United States v. Poulsen, 41 F.3d 1330, 1333 (9th Cir. 1994). The court ex-
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cess codes to a United States Army computer network, and used them to
obtain the tasking orders.
Assuming that the orders constituted information that "require[d]
protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security," and assuming that Poulsen could have been charged with obtaining
that information by using the access codes without authorization, his conduct appears to fall precisely within the intended scope of (a)(1). Yet the
U.S. Attorney determined that the prohibition of § 793 against
"unauthorized possession of ... information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be
used to the injury of the United States" 8 4 was adequate to prosecute
Poulsen. Thus, even though the alleged espionage activities were conducted by computer, and even though the information obtained thereby
was on computer tapes, the prosecution bypassed the computer-specific
provisions of § 1030(a)(1) and relied successfully on the more general
proscriptions of § 793.
If § 1030(a)(1) is unnecessary as a tool to prosecute unauthorized
obtaining of classified information by computer, it may be worth examin86
ing the reason for its enactment in the first place .85 The 1984 Act8
was
introduced on the floor of Congress in 1983, only months after the release of the popular film "War Games." That film depicted a teenaged
computer hacker who, thinking he was merely playing a game, inadvertently accessed a Department of Defense computer system and nearly
precipitated thermonuclear war. 87 The film, although an early example
of the presentation of computer "crime" in the popular media, sounded
themes that continue to reverberate in our social, cultural, and legislative
perception of computers: the awesome, virtually uncontrollable power of
computers; the clear division between those who have technological expertise and those who do not; the positioning of the young, particularly
teenaged males, as foremost among the former, and the corresponding
placement of older persons (i.e., anyone who has not grown up with
computers as a fact of daily life, including, presumably, most legislators)
among the latter; and the dangerously irresponsible behavior displayed by
computer-savvy youth. Those perceptions permeate not only the replained that "Air Tasking Orders" list "targets that the United States Air Force will attack
in the event of hostilities." Id.
84 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (1995).
85 Congress enacted the predecessor to the existing section (a)(1) in 1984 as part of a
more limited Computer Fraud and Abuse Act; the previous (a)(1), however, is identical in
all pertinent respects to the present provision.
6 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2190.
87 Activation of the missiles, and the destruction of the human race,
were narrowly
averted-again by dint of the young hacker's prowess -in the dramatic climax.
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sponse to computers and computer culture in the popular media, but in
our legislatures as well. The House Report supporting the passage of the

1984 CFAA specifically referred to testimony describing "War Games"
as a "realistic representation of the automatic dialing and access capabili-

ties of the personal computer," 88 and thus, apparently, 89 of the threat to
computer security presented by those capabilities.9"
Paragraph (a)(1) of § 1030 prohibits conduct already defined as
criminal under other federal statutes, and thus, as a legislative matter, is
simply unnecessary. That statute does, however, respond quite neatly to
the specter of a hacker who accesses a military computer and obtains information that could, and almost does, cause a nuclear war.91
88 H.R. REP. No. 98-894 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3689, 3696.
89 That testimony referred explicitly to "automatic dialing and
access capabilities,"
i.e., the ability of a computer to dial a very long series of phone numbers in order to lo-

cate one that gave access to a computer, a comparatively simple and, in itself, utterly
harmless task. The testimony cited in the House Report did not provide support for the
idea that the film offered a "realistic representation" of the possibility of using a computer to access an Air Defense Command computer, and to then "convince" that computer to launch thermonuclear weapons.
90 The New York Times, in a decidedly unauthoritative assessment of the technological plausibility of popular computer-centered films, concluded that the events depicted in
"War Games" were in fact "probably" impossible. See Victor Chen, Your Home Computer Would Scoff at These Plots, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1995, § 2 at 11.
91 The reference here to this motion picture is not as incidental or as frivolous
as may
first appear. It may be difficult to identify any other criminal statute supported on the
floor of Congress by, inter alia, a specific citation to an utterly fictional "crime." Nor
was the Judiciary Committee's report in 1984 the only occasion on which "War Games"
has been used as a frame of reference for actual conduct. When Kevin Poulsen was arrested in late 1983 after a series of "electronic break-ins" at defense-related facilities, his
arrest was reported under a headline announcing, "UCLA War Games Arrest." Jonathan
Littman, The Last Hacker, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1993, (Magazine) at 18. The British
hacker known as "Datastream" arrested in 1994 was described by a Scotland Yard detective as being "just like the character in War Games." Hopkins, supra note 81. When
the U.S. space agency, NASA, announced its move to a new Mission Control facility, the
head of its Systems Division explained the need to spend $2.8 million in computer security by saying, "You've seen the movie War Games, right? Let's say someone decides to
play 'Space Shuttle.'"
Dan Feldstein, NASA Wants Top-Flight Computer Security,
HOUSTON POST, Dec. 7, 1994, at A19 (quoting Systems Division Chief John Muratore).
When officials at the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) denied in
1995 that the hacker Kevin Mitnick had penetrated its computer system, it was noted that
"Jelver since the 1980s movie War Games suggested that their computers could be accessed and sabotaged, NORAD has dispelled periodic rumors that the latest computer
genius has broken into its system." Dick Foster, Computers Are Secure, NORAD Says,
ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEws, Feb. 18, 1995, at 33A.
In a 1985 incident, seven teenagers were charged with theft by computer under New
Jersey law; they had, police said, exchanged stolen credit card numbers, traded "secret"
phone numbers, and bypassed long-distance telephone charges. The most startling allegation, however, was Middlesex County Prosecutor Alan Rockoff's statement that they
had been "changing the positions of satellites up in the blue heavens," a statement that
led to the description of their exploits as "the latest real-life version of War Games." In
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The 1984 Committee reported that section (a)(2) 92 was designed to
punish:
offenses that may be committed with respect to the type of information protected by the Right to Financial Privacy Act [12 U.S.C. §
3401 et seq.] or the Fair Credit Reporting Act [15 U.S.C. § 1681 et
seq.].... The substantive information that would be protected by
is information that is within the scope of [those two
this provision
93
statutes].

Congress had already criminalized the execution, or attempt to execute, any scheme to defraud a financial institution or to obtain
"any. . .of the moneys . . . or other property owned by, or under the
custody or control of, a financial institution by means of false or frauduThe Committee had no
lent pretenses, representations, or promises.",
comment as to why, if such information was already protected under existing law, and if even the attempt to obtain "any property" owned by or
under the custody of a financial institution was already defined as criminal, the provisions of § 1030(a)(2) were necessary at all.
Whether the information is obtained by unauthorized use of a computer, or a copier, or by any other kind of "false or fraudulent representation," amounts to no more than a detail. If Congress intended simply
to prohibit unauthorized persons from obtaining this financial information, that aim had been thoroughly accomplished already by the language
of 18 U.S.C. § 1344, the bank fraud statute. Any question as to whether
the "information" protected by § 1030(a)(2) constituted the "property"
protected by § 1344 (a dubious question, given the "any property" language of the bank fraud statute) easily could have been resolved by
amending the language of § 1344 to make specific reference to such information. The use of a computer is not the evil that needed legislative
attention; that evil was, instead, the gaining of unauthorized access to financial data no matter how accomplished-a matter that Congress had
already addressed.
No prosecutions have been reported under this provision, even
though, as with (a)(1), potentially appropriate circumstances have arisen.
Intrusions into automatic teller banking machines could, ostensibly, be

fact, they had not altered the path of any satellite; the computers that control those satellites were, and are, not accessible by outside phone lines. See Philip Elmer-DeWitt, The
Great Satellite Caper, TIME, Aug. 29, 1985, at 65.
92 Designated at that time as (a)(3).
93 H.R. REP. No. 98-894 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3707.
94 18 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(2) (1989). By a 1989 amendment, Congress imposed penalties under this statute of up to $1 million or imprisonment of up to 30 years, or both. See
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prosecuted under this section. Although such incidents have occurred,
they have not been pursued under (a)(2).
In April and May 1993, in what was reported as "the first incident
of its type,"" a "phony" ATM was installed at a shopping mall in Connecticut. When customers attempted to access the machine with their
ATM cards, it displayed a message indicating that it was not in working
order. In fact, the machine recorded the names and access numbers from
the cards.
The perpetrators then used that information to produce
fraudulent access cards and withdraw over $100,000 from customer accounts. 96 The incident resulted in convictions for bank fraud under 18
U.S.C. § 1344 and for the production of counterfeit access devices (the
fake ATM cards) under 18 U.S.C. § 1029. 9' Even though the defendants
used a computer (both the fraudulent ATM, and the legitimate ATMs
from which they obtained money, were "computers" within the meaning
of § 1030), and even though they obtained access to protected
"information" by means of unauthorized use of a computer, they were
not prosecuted under § 1030(a)(2). The bank fraud and access device
statutes, neither of which focuses exclusively on the use of computers,
were adequate to support convictions and lengthy sentences. 98 Although
the defendants used sophisticated electronic technology to commit this
crime, it was simply a new method of committing a very old crime. 99
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit upheld a conviction for bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344, where the defendant used an ATM card to access
the accounts of bank customers and withdraw money, and then
"manipulated data" by means of a computer program to conceal his
scheme.1°° Even though the defendant used computers (both the ATM
that he accessed and the computer he used to conceal the transactions
were computers under § 1030), and obtained financial "information"
95 Kirk Johnson, One Less Thing to Believe In: Fraud at
Fake Cash Machine, N.Y.
TIMES, May 13, 1993, at Al.
96 See 2 Sentenced in $100,000 Bank Machine Fraud, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 21, 1993,
at
B5.
97 See United States v. Greenfield, 44 F.3d 1141, 1144 (2d Cir. 1995).
98 See id.; see also Mark Pazniokas, Prison Term Sustained in ATM Scam, HARTFORD

COURANT, Apr. 1, 1995, at B5.
99 As is typical of many computer-related crimes, the incident was
accompanied by

some overheated public statements. The chairman of a local computer trade association
referred to the perpetrators as "terrorists;" prosecutors called it "the new wave of criminal fraud;" the Assistant U.S. Attorney who prosecuted the case, Ronald Apter, was
quoted as saying, "[nlearly every ATM user in the country has lost some faith in the integrity and the impregnability of the automated banking system." John Larrabee, ATM
Fraud Nets Prison, USA TODAY, Dec. 21, 1993, at 3A. It requires no citation to point
out that money has been stolen from banks, in a wide variety of ingenious modes, for a
ve% long time.
I See United States v. Bonallo, 858 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1988).
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through unauthorized use of those computers, he was successfully prosecuted under the bank fraud statute, rather than the technology-specific
CFAA. The prosecution in Bonallo was brought in 1985, only shortly
after the enactment of the CFAA. Although one might hazard the guess
that the new statutory weapon would have been particularly appealing to
the prosecution, the government relied on the older, non-technological
statute to reach conduct which the new CFAA seemed to address. Again,
the computer-specific CFAA was unnecessary.101
Paragraph (a)(3), in part, prohibits unauthorized access to government computers. That conduct certainly may warrant criminal prosecution. Where the act involves some other criminal activity, for example,
theft, or where the information is put to some other criminal purpose,
such as fraud or espionage, existing statutes provide ample basis for
prosecution. Congress's concern in enacting the first portion of (a)(3),
however, was with the act of unauthorized access itself, and with the apprehension that non-computer-specific statutes would not reach such access. 102 That apprehension was unfounded.
If such access is accomplished by means of any "false, fictitious, or
fraudulent statements," it is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1001; if accomplished by the false or fraudulent use of a federal employee's access code
or password, the act is a crime under 18 U.S.C. § 912. If such access is
accomplished by use of a computer and modem, and therefore by use of
telephone wires, with fraudulent intent, it is prohibited under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1343. It is difficult to conceive of any unauthorized accessing of government information, whether by computer or by other means, that would
not fall within the ambit of one or more of these statutes.
Reportedly, the first indictment ever handed down under § 1030
arose under the "trespass" provision of the 1984 statute. 10 3 In United
States v. Fadriquela,14 the defendant was charged with unauthorized access of a computer at a Department of Agriculture Forest Service facility,
and also with wire fraud under § 1343 and making false statements to a

101

In another similar incident, in February, 1995, two people were arrested in Oregon

after they apparently broke into a van, stole an ATM access card, and proceeded to withdraw over $300,000 from the victim's bank account by using the stolen access card.
Woman Missing Bank Card Finds She Is Overdrawn $346,770, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12,
1995, at 36. A federal grand jury indicted them, not for violations of (a)(2), but for unauthorized use of an access device under 18 U.S.C. § 1029. Charges of burglary or larceny under state law, or bank fraud under § 1344, could have been equally effective in

prosecuting this conduct.
:03 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.

104See Baker, supra note 37, at 65.
No. 85-CR-40, U.S. Dist. Ct. (D. Colo. 1985) (unpublished opinion).
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federal agency under § 1001. A computer "hobbyist,"'0' the defendant
had entered the Forest Service computer using an access code he had obtained from a hacker bulletin board.10 6 He obtained no data, damaged no
data, and "seemed more interested in experimenting with the system than
in destroying any data," according to the Forest Service assistant director
of information systems. 07
Fadriquela moved to dismiss the indictment, challenging the constitutionality of § 1030, and in particular the prohibition against "affecting"
a government computer.10 8 However, he pleaded guilty to misdemeanor
counts of wire fraud, and abandoned the constitutional challenge. To the
extent that Fadriquela's conduct was properly regarded as criminal, the
provisions of § 1343 were adequate to obtain a conviction. The thencurrent version of § 1030 was not only unnecessary, but might have been
found unconstitutional.
Paragraph (a)(3) also prohibits intentional unauthorized access of a
computer
by the government, when such access
,, used "not exclusively"
109
"adversely affects the use of the Government's operation of such computer." Precisely why the unauthorized access of a shared computer is
deemed a crime only when it "adversely affects" the government's operations, whereas simple unauthorized access is criminal when the computer is used solely by the government, is a question unanswered by the
legislative history. However, the statute draws that distinction, and must
reflect some legislative determination. Prior to the 1994 amendments,
this section referred only to "affecting" the government's use of a shared
computer. The amended language refers to access that "adversely affects" the government's use. The effect of that language, and its application to specific factual situations, may not be much clearer than that of
the language it replaced.

105

See Mitch Betts, Hacker Sentenced for Accessing U.S. Agency

Computers,

COMPUTERWORLD, June 24, 1985, at 26.
106 See id.
107 Paul Korzeniowski, Agencies' Hacker Troubles Blamed on Bulletin Board,
COMPUTERWORLD, July 8, 1985, at 1. Fadriquela did no damage; indeed, his conduct
resulted in the strengthening of the security of the computer system. "We changed all
our passwords ....
The break-in has turned out to be a learning experience for us." Id.

(quoting L. Vancil, assistant director of information systems at the Lake Wood, Colo.,
Forest Service facility). "There is a way to get in [the service's] system that they didn't
even know existed-and they have since taken corrective measures." Betts, supra note
105, at 26 (quoting Assistant U.S. Attorney Cathy Goodwin).
Under those circumstances, perhaps this case was not the most appropriate for establishing precedent under §
1030. " . .. [W]e wanted to get some convictions under the new law." Id.
108 See Mitch Betts, U.S. Attorneys Push to Clarify Vague '84 DP Crime Law,
COMPUTERWORLD, July 1, 1985, at 22.
109

So in the original.
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No appellate decisions have been reported under paragraph (a)(3).
The only reported decision of any sort is Sawyer v. Department of the Air
which involved a computer programmer fired from his Air
Force,
Force job because he had accessed a computer without authorization, altered contract records, and then submitted fraudulent invoices for which
he received over $17,000.111 However, the decision sets forth virtually
no additional factual background or legal analysis, thus providing little
guidance or insight about the statute. Moreover, of course, the decision
was administrative, not criminal. A reading of the cursory opinion,
however, raises the question why, if Sawyer had "improperly" received
payments based on "fraudulent invoices" (apparently not involving any
accessing or use of a computer), he was discharged under a computerspecific statutory provision that did not even refer to fraud.
Section (a)(4) of the statute prohibits nothing more than gardenvariety fraud that happens to involve access to a government computer.
Conduct punishable under (a)(4) appears to be as easily punishable under
the general fraud statute, 1 2 or under the federal mail fraud or wire fraud
statutes" 3 or as common-law fraud. Indeed, the language of (a)(4) specifically excepts from its scope the only kind of fraud that might arguably
go beyond the general fraud statute: fraudulent use of the computer itself. 114 The use of a computer is not "anything of value," the obtaining
of which would support a prosecution under (a)(4).
Paragraph (a)(5) punishes, in part, unauthorized transmission of information that "modifies or impairs" certain medical data. The prospect
of the unauthorized use of a computer to alter medical treatment has been
raised as a particularly terrifying type of crime made possible by computer technology. The Senate Judiciary Committee, reporting the 1986
amendments to the full chamber, 1 1 5 referred to a 1983 incident in which
a group of adolescents known as the '414 Gang' broke into the computer system at Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in New
York [and] gained access to the radiation treatment records of 6,000
110 31 M.S.P.R. 193 (1986).
ill The Merit Systems Protection Board found "unpersuasive" Sawyer's claim
that he
sought merely to "point out deficiencies" in a computer accounting system. The statute
requires proof only of intentional access without authorization, so this claim would have
been irrelevant in any event.
112 See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1989).
113 See infra note 210.
114 The conduct is punishable "unless the object of the fraud and the thing obtained
consists only of the use of the computer." 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (1995). The House
Report on this provision specifically recommended that mere "'time stealing' . . . should
be handled privately or at the State or local level." H.R. REP. No. 98-894 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3708.
115S. REP. No. 99-432, reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2480.
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past and present cancer patients and had at their fingertips the ability
to alter the radiation treatment levels that each patient received.

In fact, the group neither effected nor apparently even attempted any
such alteration.

Nonetheless, the Committee relied on the "potential"

danger that the situation resented to demonstrate the need for legislation
to combat such behavior.
No prosecutions have been commenced to date under the "medical

treatment" provision of (a)(5). Indeed, research for this article turned up
no reliable reports 1 7 of any incidents in the United States' in which a
hacker altered medical data. Lethally erroneous
ministration of medicines and medical procedures
curred without the involvement of computers.1 9
errors has resulted in criminal as well as civil
116

prescription and adhave, of course, ocA variety0of medical
liability.
Because

The same report refers to the Sloan-Kettering case as "but one example of com-

puter crimes directed at altering medical treatment records." No other example is put
forward. See id.
117 In May 1995, newspapers reported that "at least one case of murder by computer
has been recorded," as a result of a hacker's alteration of a patient's medication information. The information was attributed to Professor David L. Carter of Michigan State
University, who had presented a paper on computer crime to a British law enforcement
conference. See Ray Moseley, Organized Crime Going High-Tech, Worldwide inScope,
SUNDAY GAZETTE MAIL, May 28, 1995, at 1 IA. In a telephone interview, however, Professor Carter stated that he knew of no such "murder by computer" incident and had not
related any such incident to the reporter who interviewed him. He had instead referred to
an unsuccessful attempt to tamper with drug dosage information. Telephone Interview
with David L. Carter, Professor, Michigan State University (June 26, 1995).
118Under Great Britain's Computer Misuse Act of 1990, a nurse pleaded guilty in
June 1993 to "unauthorized modification of computer material," for using a computer to
prescribe potentially dangerous drugs to a patient. The drugs were not administered; a
"sharp-eyed ward sister" noticed the change in prescription. The nurse gained access to
the computer system by using the "pin number" of a hospital doctor; he had memorized
the doctor's number while observing the doctor's awkward attempts to access the system.
Nurse-Hacker Alters Hospital Prescriptions, COMPUTER AUDIT UPDATE, Feb. 1994.
119 In December 1994, in highly-publicized incidents, two patients at the Dana
Farber
Cancer Institute died after receiving an erroneous dosage of a highly toxic cancer drug
four times its correct level. See Richard A. Knox & Daniel Golden, Drug Dosage Was
Questioned, BOSTON GLOBE, June 19, 1995, at 1. At least 13 deaths were reported as the
result of the mistaken injection of the cancer drug Vincristine, when medical personnel
confused it with another drug. See Richard A. Knox, Response Is Slow to Deadly
Mixups, BOSTON GLOBE, June 26, 1995, at 29. That same article referred to recurring
errors in the administration of cancer drugs as a result of disastrous confusion between
"look-alike and sound-alike drugs," of illegible handwriting, and of prescriptions that
mistake daily doses with multi-day doses. See id.Knox also referred to a 1991 Harvard
University study that found that 250,000 Americans are injured by medication errors each
year. See id. These terrifying errors were not the result of unauthorized access into
computerized medical databanks.
In New York v. Einaugler, 618 N.Y.S.2d 414 (App. Div. 1994), review denied,
647 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 1995), a doctor was convicted of recklessly engaging in conduct
causing a substantial risk of serious injury, under N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.20 (McKinney
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criminal liability can be, and has been, imposed for such conduct under
criminal statutes of general application, it is not apparent why conduct
involving the unauthorized use of a computer in a medical setting could
not be prosecuted under those same statutes, and why, therefore, a computer-specific statute is needed to address that possibility.
Paragraph (a)(6) prohibits trafficking in passwords or other means
by which one may access a computer unlawfully. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1029
prohibits, inter alia, trafficking in "access devices." That term is defined broadly to include "any ...means of account access." 12 ' Thus,
the language of § 1029 encompasses the narrower language of §
1030(a)(6), so that any act prohibited under (a)(6) would also violate §
1029. Both provisions identify the same mens rea: under each statute,
conduct is prohibited when it is done knowingly and with intent to defraud. Accordingly, the proscriptions of (a)(6) appear to be simply redundant and therefore unnecessary. Because no court has yet been called
upon to examine the distinctions, or lack thereof, between these two
statutes, the view offered here must await judicial confirmation or rejection.
Clearly crimes can be accomplished by means of a computer, and
where a sufficient federal interest exists, such crimes warrant federal
prosecution. However, the federal statute aimed most specifically at the
criminal use of a computer, § 1030, has not yet proved successful in supporting prosecutions that could not have been instituted under other federal statutes. Computer-related crimes have been prosecuted successfully
under other, non-computer-specific statutes, both before and after the
passage of § 1030. The provisions of § 1030 are largely duplicative of
existing statutes. The legislative conclusion expressed by Congress in
enacting § 1030, that a computer-specific statute is the only effective way
to address such conduct, was not supported by sound evidence presented
either at the time of enactment or produced thereafter.
2.

Overbreadth: It's the Crime, Not the Computer

Legislation premised on the notion that "computers are different" is
likely to be constitutionally overbroad: such legislation reflects and
amplifies the conclusion that conduct not otherwise criminal somehow
becomes criminal when it is accomplished by means of a computer. That
1995), when he fed a patient through a dialysis catheter that he mistakenly thought was a
feeding tube.
In April 1995, reckless homicide charges were brought under Wisconsin law against

a medical laboratory for misreading the pap smears of two patients who subsequently died
of breast cancer. See Gina Kolata, Medical Laboratory Faces Charges in CancerDeaths,

N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1995, at A16.
121See infra note 216 and accompanying text.
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approach proceeds from a focus on the computer its-elf, rather than on
harm; on the means rather than the result. The consequence of a computer-specific legislative approach is to invite prosecutorial attention to
technology rather than to the culpability of conduct.
The CFAA invites that misdirection of prosecutorial focus; however, because so many of its provisions do little more than duplicate existing criminal statutes, overbreadth is not the major problem with that
legislation. At least one provision of the CFAA, however, is clearly
overbroad because it prohibits conduct that is not, and probably was not
intended to be, criminal. Paragraph (a)(5), as amended in 1994, prohibits, inter alia, the transmission of a "program, information, code or
command" to a computer or computer system if the person causing the
transmission intends or recklessly disregards the substantial risk that the
transmission will damage a computer or prevent the use of that computer.
It is not difficult to understand the motivation for this provision: certainly, the possibility of a virus that incapacitates vital government computers, or telephone service, or air traffic control functions, or even large
numbers of privately used computers, seems to warrant legislative action.
The language of the new provision, however, is overly inclusive.
A computer security professional would be faced with the choice of
not testing anti-virus technology or else running the risk of prosecution.
Computer science students who write a virus programs as an academic or
research exercise could find themselves subject to criminal liability under
(a)(5) if they transmit that program to a classmate or a teacher, or if they
simply test the program to see if it works. These individuals, by writing
and testing virus or anti-virus programs, could be said at least to have
disregarded the substantial risk of damaging a computer, and would
therefore be engaging in culpable behavior. Although prosecutors might
employ their discretion and not pursue charges in such cases, reliance on
such discretion is hardly a justification for ignoring fundamental flaws in
the statute.' 22
Another section of the CFAA, (a)(6), also lends itself to overbroad
interpretation. That section prohibits "trafficking in any password or
similar information through which a computer system may be accessed
without authorization." Prosecutors sought and obtained indictments under that provision against a defendant
who obtained proprietary software, altered it so as to facilitate unauthorized access to computer systems, and then distributed the altered software by making it available
through computer bulletin boards. Although versions of the software
122 Prosecutorial discretion has been

misused in more than one computer-related
prosecution. See supra note 29 et seq.; infra notes 139 er seq., 171 et seq.
123 See United States v. Rose (N.D. II. 1990) (unpublished
opinion).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[27:574

were widely available through bulletin boards, there was no evidence that
the defendant or anyone else had used the altered version to access any
computer, 12 4 and defendant neither made nor sought money for his work,
he was charged under § 1030(a)(6).
Rose's defense included an attack on the constitutionality of (a)(6)
on the grounds that it could be read to prohibit any discussion of computer security problems and possible solutions; therefore it was overbroad, vague, and violative of First Amendment guarantees. Because
Rose's conduct was not even alleged to have included monetary gain, a
denial of his motion to dismiss would have effectively rendered such evidence unnecessary to establish "trafficking." If no evidence of sale is
necessary to establish trafficking, then simply discussing ways in which a
computer "may be accessed" without authorization, regardless of the
motive for that discussion, would amount to a federal crime. This intriguing issue was not addressed by the court because shortly after the
motion was filed Rose pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud under §
1343. Thus, at least some of the provisions of the CFAA present problems of overbreadth.
However, a much more striking illustration of an overbroad com125
puter-specific statute is the Communications Decency Act (CDA).
That statute prohibits the use of "a telecommunications device" to make
available, inter alia, "indecent" material to minors,1 26 and the use of "an
interactive computer2 7 service" to make available "patently offensive"
material to minors. 1
A broad coalition of organizations brought suit on the day the bill
was signed into law,'
seeking an injunction against enforcement
of the
CDA. In a powerful and
lengthy opinion, a three-judge panel 129 upheld
124 See Mark Potts, 'Hacker' Pleads Guilty to AT&T Case, WASH.
POST, Mar. 23,
1991, at Al. The Maryland prosecutor, U.S. Attorney Breckinridge Wilcox, stated that,
"it may be very difficult, if not impossible, to determine what, if any, damage was done."
Man Indicted on Computer Hacking Charges, UPI WiRE, May 16, 1990.
125 See Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110 Stat. 56, 133-35 (amending Title
V of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 223); see also ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.
Sugi.
824, 827 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
See 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B) (1989).
127 See 47 U.S.C. § 223 (d)(1). The court noted that the statute failed to define the
term "telecommunications device." See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 828, n.5. The
court also noted the unresolved "tension between the scope of 'telecommunications device' and the scope of 'interactive computer service'...." Id. Such definitional problems are typical of statutes written in technology-specific language.
See infra Part
III.B.3, notes 199-206.
12s February 8, 1996. See ACLU v. Reno,
929 F. Supp. at 827.
129 The panel, consisting of two judges of the United States District
Court for the Eastem District of Pennsylvania and one from the Third Circuit, was convened pursuant to
the expedited review provisions of the CDA. See § 561(a); ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp.
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the granting of an injunction, holding the statute unconstitutionally vague
and overbroad. 130 The court held that, while "obscene" material and
131

"child pornography" were already subject to criminal penalties,
"indecent" or "patently offensive" material is protected by the First
Amendment. 132

The court cited numerous examples of "offensive" or sexuallyexplicit communications that would be subject to criminal penalty under
the CDA, even if they are not obscene and even if they provide valuable
artistic or informational content, i.e., precisely the sort of communications that cannot constitutionally be prohibited. 133 The use of a computer
(a "telecommunications device") to transmit such material cannot make
such conduct
criminal when it is constitutionally protected in other con34
texts.'

The ACLU court held that the democratic conversation 135 fostered
by the Internet could not be singled out for criminal prohibition when
such conversation was protected in other situations.
Constitutional
guarantees do not disappear simply because a computer is involved.
Congress's short-sighted focus on technology, and on "Internet porn,"
rather than on established constitutional principles, led it to enact legislation that was37 overbroad and "profoundly repugnant" to the First
Amendment. 1
Even when a prosecution is based on a non-computer-specific statute, a prosecutorial focus on the computer rather than on the culpability

at 827.
130 See ACLU V. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 856, 858-59, 863. "Any content-based
regulation of the Internet, no matter how benign the purpose, could burn the global village to
roast the pig." Id. at 882.
131 See id. at 829, 857, 865.
132 See id. at 851, 871 n.10.
133 See id. 853. The CDA "would effect a complete ban even for adults of some expression, albeit 'indecent,' to which they are constitutionally entitled . . . ." Id. at 854.
The statute would thus unconstitutionally force " many speakers who display arguably indecent content on the Internet [to]choose between silence and the risk of prosecution."
Id. at 849.
134 "[Olur fundamental constitutional principles can accommodate any technological
achievements, even those which presently seem to many to be in the nature of a miracle
such as the Internet." Id. at 865 n.9 (separate opinion of Buckwalter, J.).
135 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 881.
136 "[G]overnment-imposed, content-based speech regulations are generally inconsistent with '[olur political system and cultural life'. . . ." Id. (citing Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2472 (1994)). "There is no question that a Village Green Decency Act, the fruit of a Senator's overhearing of a ribald conversation
between two adolescent boys on a park bench, would be unconstitutional." Id. at 882
(separate opinion of Buckwalter, J.).
7 See id. at 881 (separate opinion of Buckwalter, J.).
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of the conduct can lead to the same faulty conclusion: that the use of a
computer itself amounts to a crime.
In United States v. LaMacchia,13 the court dismissed an indictment
brought under § 1343, the wire fraud statute, against the operator of a
computer bulletin board on which users had made available "pirated"
software, software manufactured by private companies intended for sale
to consumers. The defendant, a student at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, was not alleged to have stolen, unlawfully obtained, or
gained unauthorized access to any of the software; instead, the prosecution was based on his operation of a bulletin board that other persons
used to make the software available. Most crucial to the court's decision,
LaMacchia charged nothing for the service, and was not even alleged to
have "sought or derived any personal benefit from this scheme. 139
LaMacchia was charged with conspiring to commit wire fraud, i.e.,4
conspiring with "persons unknown" to devise a scheme to defraud.1 0
The essence of the charge was that LaMacchia and his bulletin board users had defrauded the software manufacturers of revenues that the sales of
these programs would have generated. 14 1 Because the amount of pirated
software is estimated by the software industry at an astonishing dollar
value, 142 the case was regarded as a test of the industry's ability to stop
unauthorized copying and distribution. Because LaMacchia did not himself obtain the software, or place it on the bulletin board, or distribute it
to users-because he was merely the operator of the bulletin board system (the "sysop")-the case was regarded as a test of the liability of sysops for materials posted by other persons.' 43 And because the indictment was dismissed, the case was taken to reflect the inadequacy of144§
1343, and indeed of the law generally, to prosecute computer crimes.
138

871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994).

139 Id. at 537.

140 See id. at 540.
141 See id. at 536.
142 In 1992, the Software Publishers Association reported in testimony before Congress that software manufacturers were losing $2.4 billion annually as the result of piracy. See id. at 540 n.5. In 1993, according to that organization's position statement, an
estimated $7.5 billion was lost worldwide in sales of business application software alone.
See Software Publishers Association Position Statement on the LaMacchia Decision, reprinted in PR NEwswIRE, Jan. 5, 1995.
143 Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) owned the computer on which the
bulletin board operated. MIT was not charged in connection with the case.
144 See, e.g., Jules Crittenden, Ruling Clears Wa i]or Computer Bandits, BOSTON
HERALD, Dec. 30, 1994, at 1: 'There's no copyright law in cyberspace and computer
bandits are free to walk off with all the software they can carry until Congress does
something about it, a federal judge ruled yesterday ....

The . . . decision . . . let one

MIT cyberhombre off the hook and could start a software stampede . ... 'You have
Billy the Kid out there with his fancy modem and his computer. He's the new gun-
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The decision, although significant, reflects somewhat more modest conclusions about the state of the law.
The problem with the indictment was quite simple: the conduct alleged was not prohibited by the statute. Section 1343 punishes schemes
to defraud or to obtain money or property by fraudulent means, and the
transmission of "words, pictures, etc." for the purpose of furthering such
schemes. The indictment, however, did not allege that LaMacchia had
made any misrepresentation, or that he intended to defraud anyone, or
that he transmitted anything in order to further a fraud. The indictment
did not allege that he had devised a scheme to obtain money or property.
Instead, he merely made available, without charge, a communications
conduit that others used for their own purposes. Thus, based on the
plain language of § 1343, the indictment failed to allege conduct prohibited by that statute. The fact that computer technology was involved did
not alter that dispositive fact.
The indictment relied upon § 1343, in effect, as a means of imposing criminal penalties for copyright infringement. 145 The indictment
specified the object of the alleged scheme as "the facilitation ... of the
illegal copying and distribution of copyrighted software 14 6 without payment of licensing fees and royalties to software manufacturers and vendors." 147 But LaMacchia could not have been indicted directly for
copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 506, because that statute requires proof that the infringement was pursued "willfully and for purpose
148
of commercial advantage or private financial gain."
LaMacchia, in the tradition of the "hacker ethic," had made his
bulletin board service available, not for profit or gain, but to facilitate the
exchange of software. Because LaMacchia could not be pursued directly
for criminal copyright violation, prosecutors opted instead to rely upon
the wire fraud statute. The attraction of § 1343, the LaMacchia court
noted, was that it required no proof of intent to profit from the
scheme. 149 The language of that statute, however, ill described LaMacchia's conduct.
slinger,' said Robert Gwin, legal director of the Boston Computer Society." In fact, the
case did not address liability for obtaining copyrighted software; LaMacchia was not even
alleged to have obtained, or "walked off with," anything. Billy the Kid, according to

frontier legend, acted for the purpose of personal gain. LaMacchia, as the court explicitly held, was not even alleged to have done so. See LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 537.
145 See LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 537.

146 Computer programs are subject to copyright protection under the 1992 amendments to 17 U.S.C. § 101. See id. at 540 n.6.
147 Id. at 536.
148 Id. at 539 (tracing 17 U.S.C. § 506 (a)). Criminal penalties for copyright in-

fringement are set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (1995).
See id. at 541-42.

610

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[27:574

150
The LaMacchia court relied heavily on Dowling v. United States,
where the Supreme Court reversed a conviction for interstate transportation of stolen property under 18 U.S.C. § 2314, holding that criminal
statute inappropriate as a copyright-enforcement too,.151 In Dowling, the
defendant had engaged in an elaborate scheme to sell unauthorized copies
of copyrighted recordings; part of that scheme involved the use of the
mails to advertise the pirated records. The Dowling court found that although the defendant had criminally infringed on the copyrights, such
"interference with
52 copyright does not easily equate with theft, conversion, or fraud."'
Congress devoted "a good deal of care" to defining the conduct that
would comprise criminal copyright infringement; and those older crimes
did not fit that careful definition. An "expansive reading" of those older
statutes, equating theft or fraud with criminal copyright violations,
"would have the unsettling effect of criminalizing a broad range of conduct involving copyright and other intellectual
property that had histori53
1
laws."
civil
the
by
regulated
cally been
Copyrights are protected primarily by civil, not criminal, laws; and
the narrow range of conduct that amounts to criminal copyright infringement is defined specifically by the Copyright Act, not by the
"blunderbuss solution" 154 of equating other criminal conduct with such
infringement. "The only defense against [software] piracy is the copyright law;"' 55 permitting copyright prosecutions to proceed under the
wire fraud statute would "produce the same pernicious result ... warned

of in Dowling."

156

150

473 U.S. 207 (1985).

151

See infra note 224 and accompanying text (discussing Dowling). Although Dowl-

ing applied directly only to the use of § 2314, the Dowling Court expanded upon, and the

LaMacchia court focused upon, the relationship of the mail fraud statute to copyright enforcement.
The mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and the wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. §
1343, are virtually identical: "what can be prosecuted... under the mail fraud statute is
equally susceptible to punishment under § 1343, so long as the jurisdictional element is
met." LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 541.
Dowling, 473 U.S. at 217.
152 LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 538 (citing Dowling, 473 U.S.
153
at 228, and referring to

reasoning therein).
154
155

Dowling, 473 U.S. at 226.

LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 540 n.7 (quoting S. REP. No. 268, 102d Cong.

(1992)).
156 Id. at 544.

Dowling did not contest his conviction for copyright violations. The
Court upheld his conviction for mail fraud for reasons specific to that case: the materials

he unlawfully copied were subject to a statutory reporting requirement. Dowling was required to notify the copyright owners of his intention to distribute. He committed fraud
by intentionally failing to so notify them. No such requirement applied to the software at
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Copyright violations, whether accomplished with a computer or
other means, amount to criminal conduct only when motivated by commercial advantage or financial gain. This statutory edict is not the result
of a mere oversight; the LaMacchia court detailed the lengthy history of
the copyright statute to demonstrate repeated congressional attention to
this precise issue. 157 The court cited the congressional testimony of the
Vice President and General Counsel of the Computer & Communications
Industry of America on the 1992 amendments to the Copyright Act:
There are millions of people with personal computers to make copies.

That is exactly one of the reasons I think you want to be very careful.
You do not want to be accidentally taking a large percentage of the

American people, either small business or citizens, into the gray area
of the criminal law. 158

To hold LaMacchia criminally responsible for the unauthorized
copying, or even distribution, of copyrighted software would be to criminalize the conduct of "the myriad of home computer users who succumb
to the temptation to copy even a single computer software program for
private use. It is not clear that making criminals of a large number of
consumers of computer software is a result that even the software industry would consider desirable."159 Indeed, because LaMacchia did not
copy any software himself, his conduct was far removed from such culpability.
The LaMacchia court described the case as presenting "the issue of
whether new wine can be poured into an old bottle." 0 That characterization, and similar language used by news accounts and commentators,161
suggested that the case raised some fundamentally new legal issues.
While the technology involved was certainly comparatively new, 162 the
issue in LaMacchia, and thus there were no analogous grounds for imposing liability for
fraud. See id. at 542. There were, in fact, no grounds at all for imposing such criminal
liability.
157 The Court pursued that history through 1992, when § 506 was most
recently
amended, citing the remarks of the sponsor of the 1992 amendments, Senator Hatch, that
"the copying must be undertaken to make money [in order to warrant criminal penalties],
and even incidental financial benefits that might accrue as a result of the copying should
not contravene the law where the achievement of those benefits [was] not the motivation
behind the copying." Id. at 540 n.8.
158 Id. at 544-45 n.18.
159 Id. at 544. "The exchange of software is extremely common among the millions of
Internet users." Peter H. Lewis, Student Accused of Running Network for Pirated Software, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1994, at 1.
160 LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 536.
161 See, e.g., Peter Lewis, Judge Rejects Computer Crime Indictment, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 31, 1994, at 10 (describing the dismissal as the court's "declining to prosecute a
comuter-age crime with telegraph-era law.").
LaMacchia was reportedly the first prosecution of a "sysop" of a bulletin board on
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legal issues, to a large extent, were not. The copyright statute did not
apply, not because of the technology LaMacchia utilized, but because he
sought no financial gain. The wire fraud statute was not violated, not
because of the technology involved, but because LaMacchia devised no
scheme to defraud or to obtain anything of value. The fact that a computer was involved did not criminalize conduct that was not a crime under the language of the statute. The court's holding rested squarely on
that quite traditional, and quite appropriate, analysis.
Nevertheless, the technology did raise, and will continue to raise,
questions as to the role of the law in such cases. 163 In LaMacchia, as in
virtually every computer-related case, the search continues for an appropriate analogy with which to frame such cases; because the law operates
by analogizing new cases to earlier situations, the choice of an appropriate framework is particularly important. LaMacchia's bulletin board
might be viewed as a kind of "safe house" where unauthorized or even
stolen goods were fairly openly exchanged, little different from a place
where shoplifters might congregate to swap their loot. 164 The bulletin
board might thus be viewed as encouraging or facilitating the unauthorized distribution of software. But bulletin boards can also be compared
to libraries, where copyrighted materials are freely available to anyone.
The public is encouraged to make use of these materials, even though
they are also sold for a profit at nearby bookstores, in part because of the
social value of literacy and easy availability of information. Using that
conceptual framework, software should also be freely available to the
public (particularly, perhaps, to people of limited means) even though it
is also sold commercially; the value of computer literacy and the availability of electronic information might be a comparable social good.
which proprietary software was available free of charge, and was reported to "represent
an apparent escalation of the federal government's crackdown" on such bulletin boards.
See Barbara Carton, Man Charged in Software Piracy, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept.. 1, 1994, at
41; Michael Dresser & Nelson Schwartz, MIT Student Indicted on Piracy Charges,
BALTIMORE SuN, Apr. 9, 1994, at IA.
163 The court described LaMacchia's conduct as "heedlessly irresponsible" at best,
and "at worst as nihilistic, self-indulgent, and lacking in any fundamental sense of values," and called upon Congress to amend the copyright statute to impose criminal penalties for "multiple, willful infringements ...even absent a commercial motive." LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 545.
"To federal prosecutors, what David LaMacchia did was the electronic equivalent
of walking into Egghead Software and leaving with boxes of computer programs hidden
under his coat." Ronald Rosenberg, Technology Tests Limits of Law in Computer Case,
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 9, 1994, at 1. "Just like you wouldn't think of walking into a candy
store and walking out with a candy bar without paying for it .... [Pleople who use software should understand that a lot of hard work goes into creating software and the people
who produce that software are entitled to be paid for their efforts." Nightline (ABC television broadcast, May 2, 1994) (comments of Ken Wasch, Software Publishers Association).
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Professor Laurence Tribe compared the bulletin board to a
"common carrier" such as the telephone system: "It's like saying,
really, that the telephone company will now be guilty if people conduct
It's really an extreme
criminal conversations over the telephone.
65
stretch.'
LaMacchia's attorneys compared the bulletin board to a library where patrons duplicate pages of copyrighted books: "Nobody
suggests that the copy machine manufacturer, or the librarian, or the
board of trustees of the library should be held criminally liable for any
copyright violation, " 66 and to a non-computerized bulletin board in a
public place such as a laundromat: "If someone buys a lemon of a car
advertised on a bulletin board, can the owner of the bulletin board be indicted for what someone else uses it for? David LaMacchia maintained a
bulletin board. Get rid of the word 'computer."' 167 Imposing liability
on LaMacchia would be "like
the Boston Globe being held accountable
68
1
ads."
classified
its
for all
These competing descriptions of an appropriate parallel for computer-related activities lead to very different conclusions about liability,
both criminal and civil, and therefore to different visions of the consequences for on-line communications. 169 The choice of an appropriate and
workable analogy for assessing legal rights and responsibilities in the online environment is a crucial and, for the foreseeable future, very open
question.170
165

Nightline (ABC television broadcast, May 2, 1994) (comments of Laurence Tribe,

RaIgh S. Tyler, Jr. Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School).
Marianne Lavelle, U.S. Sees Computer Crime as Threat, NAT'L L.J.,
July 25,
1994, at A21 (quoting Harvey A. Silverglate, attorney).
167 Barbara Rabinovitz, A Case From Cyberspace, MASS. LAW. WKLY, Aug. 22,
1994, at 29.
168 Rosenberg, supra note 164, at 1 (quoting David Duncan, LaMacchia's attorney).
169

"Consider the possibilities (if liability were imposed on the operator of a bulletin

board). A user becomes disgruntled with a sysop so he uploads a dozen copyrighted programs to that bulletin board. Then he calls the Software Publishers Association's toll-free
tip line. Is this sysop guilty?" SPA Says 1st BBS Sysop Indicted, NEWSBYTES NEWS
NETWORK, Sept. 1, 1994. "Congress isn't going to want to hold the operators of computer bulletin boards criminally liable for everything anybody does with the system, because nobody would then operate these systems, and the communications highway, the
information highway, would grind to a halt." Nightline (ABC television broadcast, May
2, 1994) (comments of Harvey Silverglate, attorney). "Owners of intellectual property
rights will not be willing to put their interests at risk if appropriate systems... are not in
place to permit them to set and enforce the terms and conditions under which their works
are made available (on line)." Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure (Preliminary Draft of THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY) (the "GREEN PAPER") July 1994, at 6.
170 The decision in LaMacchia did not mandate an "open season" on the distribution
of copyrighted software. In Kenadek, unpublished decision, defendant pled guilty to a
charge of criminal copyright infringement, for conduct similar to that of LaMacchia, with
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Like LaMacchia, United States v. Baker17 involved the prosecution
of computer-related conduct under a non-computer-specific statute. As in
LaMacchia, even though the statute in Baker did not focus specifically on
the use of computers, the prosecutor did. And in both cases, the indictments were dismissed because the conduct alleged did not amount to a
the crucial distinction that he charged a fee for the use of his bulletin board. That conduct fell squarely within the prohibition of 17 U.S.C. § 506 against infringements for the
purpose of financial gain, and was thus properly punishable as a crime. LaMacchia did
not address the potential liability of the persons who obtained the software in the first
place; conceivably, that conduct might engender criminal liability. Probably more central
to the resolution of this case and others like it, however, is that copyrights are, and historically have been, protected primarily by civil enforcement actions: nothing in LaMacchia diminishes the right of a copyright holder to seek damages for the unauthorized distribution of licensed software. The Software Publishers Association brought a civil suit
against Kenadek, in addition to pressing criminal charges against him.
Two notable decisions have been reported regarding the civil liability of commercially-operated on-line services. In Cubby -v. CompuServe, 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y.
1991), summary judgment was granted in favor of the defendant, a popular on-line information and communication service. See id. at 137. The defendant there, the court ruled,
was a distributor, not a publisher, and therefore could not be held liable for the allegedly
libelous statements made by an individual subscriber absent evidence that CompuServe
knew or had reason to know of the defamatory statement; the court analogized CompuServe's legal status to that of a bookstore or newsstand vendor, which cannot be held liable
for every potentially libelous word contained in every book on its shelves absent a showing of awareness of the offending material. See id. at 139.
In Stratton-Oakmont Inc. v. Prodigy Services Corp., 1995 WL 323710, 63 U.S.L.W.
2765 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.)(Ain, J.)(Order granting partial summary judgment, May 24, 1995),
the defendant was held amenable to suit for an allegedly libelous statement made by an
individual on-line subscriber. The court there found that Prodigy should be held to the
liability standard applied to publishers rather than to the lower standard applied to mere
distributors, in large part because Prodigy had at one time held itself out as performing a
screening or editing function, and had in fact implemented editorial control over the material posted by individual subscribers. Having exercised such control, the court reasoned, Prodigy could not then avoid liability by claiming it had no control.
Recent decisions addressing the civil liability of bulletin-board operators include
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1562-63 (M.D. Fla. 1993)
(awarding partial summary judgment, and damages, against operator of for-profit bulletin
board on which users had posted unsolicited copies of images from plaintiff's magazine,
even though the "sysop" had no knowledge that the images had been made available) and
Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 682 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (preliminary
injunction issued against operator of bulletin board, who advertised and sold by means of
the bulletin board certain devices, the "only substantial use" of which was to copy plaintiff's video games; defendant charged a fee for the use of the bulletin board, and knowingly facilitated the unauthorized copying of copyrighted games).
For an overview of issues regarding liability of sysops and systems administrators,
see generally LANCE ROSE & JONATHAN WALLACE, SYSLAW (2d ed. 1992); although useful, the material presented there has been overtaken in some significant respects by subsequent legislation, case law, and other events- an inevitable hazard to which virtually all
commentary on computer law, including this article, is subject. The same authors present
more recent material, although largely peripheral to the subject of this article, in NETLAW
(1995).
171 890 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (Cohn, J.).
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crime, and the defendant's use of a computer did not make his conduct
criminal. Both cases were pursued because the prosecution focused on
the use of a computer rather than on the culpability of the defendant's
conduct. Although these cases were brought under statutes of general
applicability, the prosecutions were flawed for the same reason that computer-specific statutes are flawed: they proceeded from the premise that
the technology itself engendered a criminal dimension to conduct otherwise innocent.
The prosecution in Baker was based on the electronic mailing (emailing) of statements alleged to be threats. The Baker court relied on
traditional grounds for the dismissal (the conduct did not amount to the
crime alleged), but, in unusually strong language, the court criticized the
prosecution for even commencing the action. In the court's view, the
decision to prosecute resulted from a focus on the technology rather than
on the (absence of) culpability of the conduct.
The defendant in Baker, a student at the University
of Michigan,
•
172
had posted a lurid story depicting graphic sexual violence to a newsgroup. 173 The defendant had then exchanged a series of private' 74 e-mail
messages with another user of that newsgroup, identified as "Arthur
Gonda," which centered on similarly graphic, sexually violent fantasies.
The original story depicted the fictional rape of a character to whom
Baker gave the name of a female classmate.
A Michigan alumnus who
happened to be browsing the newsgroup read Baker's story, recognized
the name of the classmate, and notified authorities at the university.
Discovery of Baker's fiction led to a great deal of publicity, both locally and nationally, 177 and to a police investigation that turned up 178 the
private e-mail messages between Baker and "Gonda" and resulted in an
indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), alleging the transmission in interstate commerce of a "communication containing any threat to kid172 The defendant attached the following statement to the beginning of the story: "The
following story contains lots of sick stuff.

You have been warned."

United States v.

Baker, Indictment No. 95-80106, Feb. 14, 1995, Exhibit 1.
173 A newsgroup is an electronic forum, or message center, typically
devoted to conversations in a specific subject area. Baker posted his original story to a newsgroup entitled "alt.sex.stories." See Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1379, 1386.
174 The posting in the newsgroup was "publicly" available to anyone with the technology to access that newsgroup; the e-mail messages between the defendant and Gonda
were accessible only to the conversants. See id. at 1379.
175 See id.
176 See Peter H. Lewis, Writer Arrested After Sending Violent Fiction Over Internet,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1995, at A10.
177 See Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1379 & n.3.
178 Baker consented to the search of the messages stored on his computer. See id. at
1379 n.4.
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nap ...or injure (any) person." 179
The indictment, based on
"unspecified
communications ... presumably includ[ing]"
Baker's
original story, 180 alleged that they amounted to threats.
Baker's story, offensive and even disturbing as it may have been,
was a fictional account of a fictional event. It amounted to a fantasy that
included the name of a real person; it was not a threat to carry out the
fantasized acts, or indeed to do anything at all, to the woman whose
name was used. The prosecution, eventually recognizing that the story
did not amount to a threat, dropped the charge based upon the story altogether. 18 1
A superseding indictment was based solely on the e-mail messages
between Baker and Gonda. 18 2 But those messages too, the court held,
did not amount to threats and could not support an indictment under §
875. The decision centered on the First Amendment limitations on
prosecutions of "threats." 183 A statement is prosecutable as a threat under § 875, the court held, only when it is "so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as to the person threatened as to convey a
gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution." 184 Moreover, a
statement that "would not be interpreted by any foreseeable recipient as
expressing a serious intention to injure or kidnap simply is not a threat

under the statute."

185

Baker's e-mail messages did not cross that threshold, and were
therefore constitutionally protected. Most of the messages could not be
described as targeting an ascertainable class of persons.
Because they
were all private messages addressed to Gonda, Gonda was the only

179 The indictment named both Baker and "Gonda" as defendants.

Gonda was never

located; the court noted that the name was assumed to be an electronic alias.

"Gonda's

identity is entirely unknown; 'he' could be a ten-year-old girl, an eighty-year-old man, or
a committee in a retirement community playing the role of Gonda gathered around a
computer." Id. at 1386.
Id. at 1380.
181 See id. n.6.
182 See Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1380.
183 "Because prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) involves punishment
of pure
speech, it necessarily implicates and is limited by the First Amendment." Id. at 1381.
18 Id. at 1382 (citing United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1975)). The
court also relied extensively on virtually identical language from Watts v. United States,
394 U.S. 705 (1969).
185 Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1384.
186 One message expressed Baker's desire to "do it to... a 13 or 14 [year old]." Id.
at 1387. The bill of particulars, with regard to the count based on that message, somewhat astonishingly identified as targets of that statement "13 and 14-year-old girls who
reside in ... Baker's

neighborhood

in Ann

Arbor, Michigan,

(hometown) neighborhood in Boardman, Ohio." Id. at 1387-88.

and ...

in Baker's
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"foreseeable recipient." ' 187 Given the utter lack of evidence as to
Gonda's identity, no conclusion could be reached as to whether that
"person" would regard the messages as expressing a serious intention to
act; and no evidence was adduced to suggest that conclusion. 8 8 More
simply, and more important, none of the messages actually threatened to
take any action. They were, as the court made clear, nothing more than
shared fantasies, containing no indication whatsoever of any intention to
undertake any act at any time, let alone to kidnap or injure any identifiable person or persons. At no time did the messages indicate the
"imminent prospect of execution" of any such act. 189
As a matter of constitutional and statutory analysis, the decision expressed a quite straightforward, unsurprising application of the law. The
decision rested on well-established, traditional grounds: the communications simply did not amount to threats, and could not support a prosecution premised on allegations that they did. The fact that a computer was
involved did not criminalize conduct that would not have been criminal
had it been accomplished by other means; the legal protections afforded
speech by the First Amendment do not vanish in the presence of a computer.' 90 To a large extent, Baker did not implicate any legal doctrine
specific to the use of technology, and is thus not a "computer-crime"
case at all. 19 1
However, the court made very clear its view that the use of computer technology had been central to the decision to prosecute Baker.
The opinion went beyond merely dismissing the indictment. The court
found that the indictment was based upon poor judgment and reflected an
indifference to the clear requirements of the law. Attention to the law, as
the court demonstrated in its review of "threat" cases, would have compelled the conclusion that the e-mail messages clearly fell outside the
prosecutorial ambit. The statute punishes only transmitting threats to
injure or kidnap,192 and there was no evidence that Baker had engaged in
that conduct.

187

The classmate whose name was used in the story became aware of the material

only because of the actions of the alumnus and of the University of Michigan. See Lewis,
supra note 176, at A 10.
18
See Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1386.
189

See id. at 1386-90 (addressing each count individually).

190 The Washington Post editorialized that "a lot of what happens on the Internet may
be best covered by existing laws, at least on the criminal side." Real and Virtual Crimes,
WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1995, at A24.
191 The Electronic Frontier Foundation declined to enter the case as amicus, precisely

because it viewed the case as a "traditional"-i.e., not technology-specific -prosecution.
192See generally Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1380-91 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)
(1995)).
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The court described the dismissal as "inevitable" and found the decision to prosecute a perplexing one:
The government's enthusiastic beginning petered out to a salvage effort once it recognized that the communication which so much
alarmed the University of Michigan officials was only a rather savage
and tasteless piece of fiction. Why the government
193 became involved
in the matter is not really explained in the record.
The Baker court concluded with the admonition that "about the best
thing the government's got going for it at this moment is the sincerity of
purpose exhibited by (the prosecutor). I am not sure that sincerity of
purpose is either synonymous with
194 a good case under the law, or even
the exercise of good judgment."
That remarkable language suggested the court's view that the prosecution stemmed precisely from the involvement of the computer. The
court's opinion, and the factual context of the case, indicate compellingly
that the defendant's use of a computer was central to the decision to
prosecute. The court specifically noted that the prosecution was based
upon Baker's transmission of words
by means of the Internet, a relatively new communications medium
that is itself currently the subject of much media attention .... While
new technology such as the Internet may complicate analysis and may
sometimes require new or modified laws, it does not in this instance
qualitatively change the analysis under the statute or under the First

Amendment. 195
The court noted that all of the messages upon which the indictment
was based were private, and that "it is only as a result of this prosecution
and the ensuing publicity that the content of the messages have been publicly aired." 19 As to the treatment of Baker, the court went out of its
way to note that Baker had been held in custody for twenty-nine days, a
circumstance the court found "disturbing" and "inexplicable." 197 Taken
together with the court's comments about the "judgment" of the prosecution, the publicity surrounding the case, and the prominent role of

193Id.at 1390.
194Id.at 1391.
195 Id.at 1390.
196 Id.at 1386.
197 See Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1379 n.5. The court noted that psychiatric evaluations

conducted during investigation of this case concluded that Baker "presented no clear and
present danger ...to anyone" and "displayed no risk factors for potential violence." Id.
The court found that "why Baker was ... taken into custody.., is inexplicable," and
termed the prosecution's justification "farfetched." Id.
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technology, 19 the court made clear that it viewed this detention as a direct result of the decision to prosecute Baker as an "Internet porn" case.
Baker's conduct was not criminal, and.his use of electronic technology did not make it so. Yet he was charged, and in effect punished, because of the prosecution's focus on his use of a computer. That focus on
technology led to the prosecution of conduct that was not criminal.
Criminal statutes that focus on technology rather than on conduct invite
similar results.
3.

Definitional Problems with the Computer-Specific
Approach

The adoption of the computer-specific legislative approach entails a
constant struggle to provide a workable and effective definition of the
targeted technology. 99 To the extent that statutes are defined in terms of
specific technology, continuing advances in technology and the ingenuity
of those determined to use that technology to criminal ends will constantly threaten to render those statutes obsolete.
The statutory definition of the crucial term "computer" illustrates
this point. Without a workable definition of that term, any computerspecific statute will prove utterly ineffective. The legislative effort to
provide such a definition dates back to the earliest proposed statutes, and
promises to continue as long as statutes employ such language. The 1984
House Report on the CFAA2 0 candidly admits that
[t]he whole issue of defining the word 'computer' has plagued the
consideration of computer crime legislation since its early days....
Initially, it was the Subcommittee on Crime's opinion that the dictionary definition was as good as one available considering the volatile state of technology in this area. The Committee decided, however, that a specific definition was desirable in2 01
order to avoid attacks
upon the statute on the grounds of vagueness. ,
The initial federal attempt at defining a "computer" in the proposed
1979 legislation2°2 proved sufficiently unsatisfying that it was modified in
the 1984 Act:
198

199

See id. at 1390.
See supra note 127 (addressing the confusing and inconsistent technological lan-

guge set forth in the Communications Decency Act).
The very title of the statute is something of a misnomer; most of its provisions do
not directly address fraud. Moreover, despite its original 1984 title, 18 U.S.C. § 1030
never addressed "access devices."
201 H.R. REP. No. 98-894 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3709.
The proposed 1979 statute defined a computer as "an electronic device which performs logical, arithmetic, and memory functions by the manipulations of electronic or
magnetic impulses, and includes all output, processing, storage, software, or communica-
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"[C]omputer" means an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical
or other high-speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or
communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction
with such device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or
typesetter, a portable hand-held calculator, or other similar
20 3
device.

This definition may represent, in most instances, a quite effective
and workable definition. Nevertheless, problems in its application are all
too easy to envision. A calculator appears to satisfy all aspects of the
definition, and yet is explicitly excluded from the scope of the statute.
The rationale for its exclusion may be hypothesized; but without some
specific statutory guidance, that unexplained exclusion invites unnecessary confusion and litigation. If the exclusion is based solely on its size
(as suggested by the "portable hand-held" description), then surely an
argument might be presented about the exclusion of some other small
device. If a laptop computer would not so challenge the definition, consider a possible next-generation "computer" that might be entirely
"hand-held."
Consider the possibility of a wrist-watch with extensive
computing or telecommunications capability. Consider a product marketed as a calculator, but which also has telecommunications capabilities.
A camera may be described as an optical data-processing device possessing storage functions, and thus appears to fall within this definition; yet it
makes little sense to ascribe to Congress the intent to include a camera as
a vehicle for committing computer fraud or abuse. Would a "data storage facility" include a building containing a telephone company switching station or indeed a telephone company office building, thus defining
the structure itself as a "computer"? One need not accept the cogency of
all of these examples to acknowledge the perplexing difficulty of providing a definition that is neither over- nor under-inclusive. Inevitable
changes in technology will present unforeseeable problems with any
definition of a "computer."
The solution to this definitional problem
does not lie in statutory language prescient enough to anticipate technology not yet invented. The solution instead is to focus on the prohibited
result, for example theft or unauthorized alteration of data, and not on the
particular means used to achieve that result.
Similarly, definitional problems complicate the effort to combat
computer "viruses" by means of technology-specific statutes. The specter of harmful viruses-programs capable of being transmitted from one
computer to another, attaching themselves to the operating system of
tion facilities which are connected or related to such a device in a system or network."
S. 240, 96th Cong. (1977); see also Tompkins & Mar, supra note 32, at 463 n.17.
W3 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1) (1995).
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those computers, and then causing damage, including deletion or alteration of data or even the "crashing" of computers or computer systemswas brought to public attention probably most forcefully by the Internet
virus" or ""worm" released by Robert Morris in 1988.
Particularly
in the few years following that highly-publicized (but ultimately quite
harmless, and possibly in the long run even beneficial) event, computer
users and the public were presented regularly with threats of new, hazardous, or potentially catastrophic viruses.205
Largely in response to reports and rumors of such viruses that surfaced repeatedly in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Congress amended the
CFAA in 1994 to prohibit the transmission of a "program, information,
code or command" with intent to cause damage to a computer. The focus of that statute is on the thing transmitted, rather than the causation of
harm. While that language appears to include all forms of what we now
know as "viruses," the relentless pace of technological change may very
well make possible some pernicious worm or virus that does not easily
fall under that definition.
By defining the crime in terms of technology, however, Congress
has tied its legislative hopes to that existing technology. In effect, Congress simply hoped that the technology will not dramatically change.
Had Congress chosen instead to focus on harm caused by conduct, however, the statute would not be limited to the current state of knowledge.
Harm is still harm, no matter the sophistication of the machine that facilitates it.
Definitional problems arise also regarding the crucial term
"access," which appears in five of the six sections of the CFAA, and
204 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
205 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 37, at 61. The threat of viruses has proven to
be
much better as the subject of newspaper and television stories than as an accurate description of real events. In fact, despite the media attention given to this threat, there has
been no incident in which a virus has caused any appreciable damage. No virus, or
worm, has ever spread as widely as Morris's worm; and that incident caused no damage
at all other than the "down time" of certain computers and the time invested by programmers in successfully combating the worm. Thus, there is no body of historical evi-

dence indicating that viruses have presented a substantial threat to the welfare of the nation.
Indeed, the transmission of viruses may not represent a serious threat in the future;
more mundane and familiar types of criminal behavior now appear to be the most troublesome source of disruption. "The most dangerous viruses don't spread too far. They tend
to blow up, people notice them and devise an anti-virus." Bill Kenny, programmer at

Digital Dispatch. "Computer viruses still are a serious problem, but our large company
clients now view them as under control. In other words, they see them more as expensive nuisances." Michael Major, Taking the Byte Out Crime: Computer Crime Statistics
Vary as Much as the Types of Offenses Committed, MIDRANGE SYS.

1993, at 25 (quoting Donn Parker, computer security consultant).

MAO., Mar. 23,
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which can fairly be described as the operative act prohibited by the statute. Paradoxically, at least some members of Congress are aware of the
When section (a)(5) was
difficulties inherent in prohibiting "access."
amended in 1994, the sponsor of the amendment, Senator Leahy, addressed this issue directly:
Under the [1986] statute, prosecution of computer abuse crimes must
be predicated upon the violator's gaining "unauthorized access" to
the affected "federal interest computers." However, computer abusers have developed an arsenal of new techniques which result in the
replication and transmission of destructive programs or codes that
inflict damage upon remote computers to which the violator never
gained "access" in the commonly understood sense of that term. The
new subsection of the CFAA created by this bill places the focus on
harmful intent and resultant harm, rather than on the technical concept
of computer "access. "206
This statement focuses squarely on the problems caused by defining
computer-related crime in terms of technology, even in language as relatively non-specific as "access." As Senator Leahy recognized, the technology changes and will continue to change. The solution is not to replace "access" with a more up-to-the-minute term of art; the solution is
to focus on the harmful result and not on particular means of inflicting
that harm. Despite this recognition in the legislative history and in the
amended (a)(5), the remaining provisions of the CFAA are still couched
in terms of "access."
Somewhat similarly, the focus of the earlier version of (a)(5) on access to "information" has been replaced by an emphasis on intentional,
or reckless, transmission of programs or commands that cause damage.
Although not explicitly stated by Senator Leahy, this change also could
be described as "focus[ing] on harmful intent and resultant harm," rather
than on the somewhat more "technical" concept of "information."
To the extent that harm is a simpler, more general and more legally,
familiar term, courts and prosecutors are likely to find it easier to work
with than the more technical "information." Precedent will help to supply answers in potentially grey areas and forestall unnecessary argument
in many situations. "Information," on the other hand, may invite litigation and require courts to grapple uncomfortably with the language of
technology. Likewise, "transmission" may prove to be more easily and
generally applied than "access."
As noted by Senator Leahy, changes in technology have already
blurred the meaning of "access." The question of whether a defendant
has sent (transmitted) a program from his computer, however, is much
206 140 CONG. REc. S12,312 (daily ed. Aug. 23, 1994) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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less likely to raise troublesome technical issues. More important, the focus on result-damage or loss-is far preferable to a concentration on a
particular, difficult-to-define set of actions taken by a defendant on his
keyboard. Courts have been able to apply the malleable concept of damage to a very broad range of situations; determining whether damage has
been caused requires no technological expertise. If a crime is defined in
terms of specific computer operations, in contrast, prosecutions will have
to focus on technology even as that technology rapidly evolves. To the
extent that the amended section is defined in terms of harm or damage, it
is likely to prove more effective than its predecessor.
4.

Imprecision: The "Uneasy Fit" of Computer-Specific
Statutes

Much of the rationale supporting the enactment of computer-specific
statutes stems from the idea that traditional crimes such as larceny or
trespass do not easily apply in the computer setting. The House Report
accompanying the original 1984 legislation asserted that, "[d]ifficulties in
coping with computer abuse arise because much of the property involved
does not fit well into categories of property subject to abuse or theft
. . . .,
These difficulties led the Report to conclude that "traditional
theft/larceny statutes" would not be effective in combating "computer
assisted crimes." Congress accepted that conclusion, refusing to rely on
those statutes of general application, because it determined that they
would not "fit well" with computer-related criminal conduct; new, computer-specific statutes were necessary to counter this "new" wave of
criminal conduct.
Curiously, however, Congress responded to this problem by enacting a fraud statute as the major weapon against computer crime. Fraud
was and is already prohibited by a variety of federal statutes; a specific
computer fraud statute appears to be superfluous. Fraud is a traditional
crime, and a fraud statute scarcely constitutes an innovative means of response to the prospect of new, unprecedented crimes that cannot be adequately prosecuted under traditional statutes. Thus, Congress's response
seems at odds with its own reasoning.
Moreover, fraud is an imprecise, and largely inaccurate, description
of the conduct Congress sought to prohibit with § 1030. That conduct is
much more appropriately described as unauthorized access, or unauthorized manipulation of data, or simply theft, than as fraud. For instance, to
describe Morris's conduct as "fraud" requires the invention of an unwieldy legal fiction: that he intentionally misrepresented himself to a se2o7 H.R. REP. No. 98-894 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.

3689, 3695.
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ries of computers by using a password or access code that was not his.
In fact, he did not represent himself directly to any remote computer at
all; the worm, or virus, moved to new machines without any further action on Morris's part. He did not intend to gain anything, a necessary
element of the crime of fraud. Morris's conduct might have been criminal, but it does not easily fall within the definition of fraud.
Because almost all computer-crime prosecutions involve allegations
of unauthorized access, the traditional crime of fraud frequently will not
"fit well" with the defendant's conduct in such cases; if that lack of fit
was the reason for Congress's refusal to rely on traditional crimes such
as larceny or trespass, Congress should have similarly rejected the use of
fraud.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

The conduct most often at the heart of "computer crime" cases, and
the conduct to which computer crime legislation should be addressed, is
unauthorized access of, misuse of, or damage to, information. It is the
protection of information-whether that information is "owned" by the
government, a bank, a hospital, or a private individual-that is, or
should be, the aim of legislation in this area. Statutes that seek appropriately to protect information, and to punish unauthorized theft, alteration, or deletion of properly restricted information, perform an important
role in modern criminal justice. That role has been, and continues to be,
fulfilled quite adequately by existing "traditional" criminal statutes. The
difficulties envisaged by Congress in a reliance on such statutes are
largely illusory; to the extent that such problems do exist, they can be
cured easily by straightforward definitional clarification. Such statutes
are likely to be more effective vehicles for the prosecution of computerrelated crimes. Statutes that focus instead on the technical means by
which a prohibited result may be achieved tend to be unnecessary, imprecise, and quickly outstripped by changing technology.
A.

Prosecutions Under Other Statutes

Underlying the enactment of computer-specific statutes is the view
that statutes of general application are inadequate to prosecute computer
crimes. This view has been expressed in the proceedings of Congress
since at least 1979. Commentators have urged the same point, arguing
that statutes drafted without specific regard to technology can be applied
to computer crimes 2 only
by stretching those statutes to, and sometimes
08
beyond, their limits.
208

See Roddy, supra note 32, at 352-57, 365; Susan Hubbell Nycum, The Criminal
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In fact, the cases do not support that conclusion. Computer crimes
have been prosecuted successfully under non-computer-specific statutes,
both before and after the enactment of technology-specific statutes.
The wire-fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, has produced more convictions for computer-related crimes than § 1030 or any other computerspecific statute. °9 Section 1343 authorizes punishment of:
[w]hoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or
causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs,
signals, pictures or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme
or artifice.
The sweep of this statute is very broad indeed. Its application to
computer-related conduct proceeds, of course, from the term "wire." Because communication between remote computers entails the use of telephone lines, no court has questioned the inclusion of such computer
communications within the scope of the statute.
The wire-fraud statute has been successfully used to prosecute the
unauthorized accessing of computer systems by modem and phone
lines. 2
To the extent that such conduct comprises the essence of most
"computer crimes," § 1343 has proven an effective tool for prosecuting
those crimes. If the element of fraud presented a troublesome element in
such prosecutions, Congress has carried that element forward to §
1030.
Thus, the computer-specific § 1030 represents no significant
improvement over the broader § 1343.
In 18 U.S.C. § 1029, Congress prohibited "fraud and related activity in connection with access devices." As originally enacted in 1984,
and until its amendment in 1994, its provisions prohibited the knowing
production, use, or trafficking of counterfeit or unauthorized access de212
vices with the intent to defraud.
The crucial term "access device" is
defined as "any card, plate, code, account number, or other means of ac-

Law Aspects of Computer Abuse, 5 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & L. 271 (1975).

W9 See James Tramontana, Note, Computer Viruses: Is There A Legal Antibiotic?, 16
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 253, 263 (1990).
210 See, e.g., United States v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1978) (resulting in a
conviction under the wire-fraud statute prior to the enactment of § 1030).
211See discussion of the "uneasy fit" of fraud to computer crimes, supra Part III.B.4.
212 See 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(1) (1995).
The statute also prohibited trafficking in or
using access devices and thereby obtaining "anything of value aggregating $1000 or
more," the knowing possession of multiple such devices with the intent to defraud, and
the knowing production or possession of device-making equipment with the intent to defraud. Id.
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count access that can be used ... to obtain ... 2any
13 ... thing of value
or that can be used to initiate a transfer of funds."
The statute has been applied by the courts to protect a wide variety
of the increasing number of assets and services that can or must be accessed through digital gateways. Congress's overriding concern, however, was credit card fraud; the statute was enacted in 1984 under the title "Credit Card Fraud Act.", 2 14 Specifically, the legislature intended to
punish "the actual counterfeiting or altering" of credit cards, the
"stealing and use of account numbers," the "possession of fraudulent
cards or other similar payment devices," and the "use or sale of any device or mechanism which could be used in the place of a legitimate payment device (such as sales slips or credit slips).""'
The legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended to prohibit credit card fraud, but realized that such fraud could be effected in a
variety of ways. Congress could have responded to this drafting problem
by enacting a statute limited to credit cards and credit card fraud, and
that specifically referred to each of the particular problems identified
above. The result might well have been a fairly narrow statute, with no
application to situations not directly involving credit cards, and that
would have been subject to litigation regarding the definition of "credit
card." Situations that Congress intended to address might well have
fallen outside the scope of such limited language.
The approach taken originally, however, was to draft the statute in
language broad enough to cover the range of fraudulent activity Congress
intended to prohibit and broad enough to include a wide variety of known
and not-yet-known methods devised to facilitate the fraudulent use of
credit cards. The result was the statutory focus on "access devices."
Because of the breadth of that language, the statute has been applied
successfully in a variety of cases involving misuse of access devices, including long-distance telephone service access codes, 216 automatic teller
machines and ATM cards, 217 and cellular telephone access numbers, 218 as
well as credit cards.2 19 The provisions of § 1029 might literally be applied to conduct involving very low technology indeed, such as writing
down or simply memorizing a credit card number in order to access that
account fraudulently. However, mindful of the legislative focus on de213

§ 1029(e)(1).

214 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2183.
215 H.R. REP. No. 98-894 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.A.A.N. 3689, 3691.
216
217
21:
219

See,
See,
See,
See,

e.g.,
e.g.,
e.g.,
e.g.,

United
United
United
United

States
States
States
States

v.
v.
v.
v.

Brewer, 835 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1987).
Greenfield, 44 F.3d 1141 (2d Cir. 1995).
Bailey, 41 F.3d 413 (9th Cir. 1994).
Lee, 815 F.2d 971 (4th Cir. 1987).
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vices that afford electronic means of gaining unlawful access, courts have
restricted its scope accordingly. 22 But even as restricted to technologically sophisticated devices, the statute has proven to be of considerably
broader application than it would have been had Congress focused on the

specific means (credit cards) rather than on the result (production or use
of counterfeit "access devices").

The utility of the statute serves as an

instructive example of legislation not defined in terms of specific technoloy or specific technological means, but in terms of the prohibited result.
Title 18 U.S.C. § 2314, which prohibits the interstate transportation
of stolen property (ITSP), 222 predates computer technology and was not
220 The court in Bailey, while reversing the district court, cited with apparent approval
the lower court's comment that, "[w]hat legislative history there is [regarding § 10291
indicates that the purpose of this legislation was to prevent access to accounts.. . . If
you follow the [prosecution's] line of reasoning then even a crowbar could be an access
device because you could use it to pry open an ATM machine." Bailey, 41 F.3d at 416.
221 The original provisions remain in effect. However, in 1994, a number of additional substantive provisions were added. Congress amended the statute to prohibit, inter
alia, the use, production, trafficking in or possession of a "telecommunications instrument
that has been modified or altered to obtain unauthorized use of telecommunications services," with the intent to defraud. Ironically, these added provisions suffer from the same
problems identified in § 1030. The amendments are unnecessary. They prohibit conduct
that is already prohibited, either under the earlier provisions of § 1029, or under other
existing statutes. Fraudulently "effect[ing] transactions" with an unauthorized "access
device" is prohibited under § 1029(a)(1); doing so and thereby gaining "anything of
value" is prohibited by (a)(2). The prohibition of (a)(6) against soliciting, with the intent
to defraud, for the purpose of offering or selling information about an access device, is
simply redundant of the prohibition in (a)(4) against "trafficking" and possessing access
devices. The language of (a)(7), prohibiting the "present[ation] for payment," without
authorization and with the intent to defraud, of a record of a transaction made by an access device, adds nothing to the much simpler and more direct language of (a)(1) and
(a)(2), which prohibit using an unauthorized access device and obtaining anything of
value by doing so. The other two added provisions, (a)(5) and (a)(6), prohibit conduct
that is already made criminal under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18
U.S.C. § 2511.
Moreover, the language of these provisions represents a retreat from the broader, effective language of the original statute, and instead focuses on specific technology:
"telecommunications instruments" and "scanning receivers." Instead of the quite effective focus on results- the unauthorized use of access devices-these added provisions
simply enumerate two specific means of achieving that prohibited result. If it is already a
crime to use with the intent to defraud any unauthorized access device, no legislative
function is served by adding a prohibition against the use with the intent to defraud of a
specific unauthorized access device.
222 Section 2314 applies, in part, to whoever "transports, transmits, or transfers in
interstate or foreign commerce any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the
value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been stolen, converted or taken by
fraud."
Its companion provision, § 2315, provides for the punishment of whoever
.receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes of any goods, wares, or
merchandise, securities, or money of the value of $5,000 or more.., which have
crossed a State or United States boundary after being stolen, unlawfully converted, or
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enacted to combat computer-related crimes. Nevertheless, several computer-related prosecutions have been brought successfully under that
statute, even after the passage of § 1030. On its face, § 2314 describes
the conduct at issue in many computer-related cases much more comfortably than the CFAA:

the cases usually involve the transmission or

"transportation" of unlawfully obtained computer data, rather than an
awkward approximation of fraud.
Section 2314, however, has proven
to be a problematic tool for prosecuting computer-related conduct: several such prosecutions have resulted in dismissal of the computer-related
charges based on § 2314. The stumbling block here is the Supreme
Court's224reading of "property" under that statute in Dowling v. United
States.
22 5
Dowling involved a scheme to manufacture and distribute bootleg
phonograph records containing performances of copyrighted musical
compositions. The physical objects the defendant sought to distributethe tangible vinyl disks-were not alleged to have been stolen. 226 Instead, the prosecution under § 2314227 was based on the view that "the
unauthorized use of the musical compositions rendered the phonorecords
'stolen, converted, or taken by fraud' within the meaning of the statute. ',228 Thus, regarding the conduct element of § 2314, the government's theory was that the unauthorized use of the musical compositions-i.e., the infringement of the copyrights on those compositionsamounted to unlawful obtaining, and was thus equivalent to theft, conversion, or fraudulent taking. With regard to the element of "goods,
wares, or merchandise" under § 2314, the indictment alleged that it was
the "performances," contained in reproducible magnetic impulses, which
comprised the allegedly stolen "property. " 229 The Supreme Court,
finding that § 2314 had been applied only to physical objects that had
themselves been "stolen, converted or taken or fraud," held that "the
statutory language, by requiring that the 'goods, wares, [or] merchandise',
taken, knowing the same to have been stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken."
223 Proof of interstate transportation, typically over telephone lines, of course serves as
a limitation on federal prosecution; but the CFAA has similar jurisdictional thresholds.
See supra note 73.
224 473 U.S. 207 (1985).
225 "A 'bootleg' phonorecord is one which contains an unauthorized copy of a commercially unreleased performance." Id. at 209 n.2.
226 See id. at 214.
227 Dowling was also convicted of copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 506; that
conviction was not contested before the Supreme Court. See id. at 209.
228 Id. at 215.
229

The prosecution did not contend that the transported "goods, wares, or merchan-

dise" were the copyrights themselves. It is not clear how such a claim could have been
pursued; and the Court foreclosed that line of reasoning: "[the infringer ...does not
assume physical control over the copyright. . .

."

Dowling, 473 U.S. at 217.
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be 'the same' as those 'stolen, converted, or taken by fraud,... seems
clearly to contemplate a physical identity between the items unlawfully
obtained and those eventually transported, and hence some prior physical
taking of the subject goods. '' 230 Because there was no "physical identity" between the intangible copyrights and the tangible records, the conduct alleged was beyond the reach of § 2314. Dowling was properly
convicted of copyright infringement, but not of the transportation of
"property" that had been "stolen, converted, or taken by fraud."
Thus, Dowling could be read to hold § 2314 applicable only to tangible physical property, and not to intangible property such as the magnetic impulses comprising a musical recording.
That reading was applied to exclude charges in an analogous situation involving computer data. In United States v. Brown,23 ' the defendant was charged under §§ 2314 and 2315 with the transportation and
possession of a computer source code2 32 taken unlawfully from his former employer. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the charges,
holding that computer source code is "not the type of property which is
contemplated within the language of the statute, 'goods, wares, or merchandise,"' and therefore could not constitute "property," the theft, conversion, or fraudulent taking of which would be subject to prosecution
under § 2314.233 The computer data comprised intangible intellectual
property, while the statute applied only to tangible, physical "goods,
wares, or merchandise." The Brown court expressly relied on Dowling
to reach that conclusion: the "essential ingredient of the statute-the involvement of physical 'goods, wares [or] merchandise' that were themselves 'stolen, converted, or ' 234
taken by fraud'-was missing in Dowling
and is likewise missing here."
Thus, Dowling and Brown appear to foreclose the use of § 2314 as a
tool for prosecuting the unauthorized taking, or transfer, of computer
data, on the grounds that computer data is not "property" within the
meaning of that statute. A close reading of Dowling, however, leads to a
quite different conclusion. Dowling can be read merely to exclude §
2314 as a tool for prosecuting copyright infringement. 2 35 The bulk of the
M Id. at 216.
925 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1991).
232 The court explained as follows:
231

guage,

. . .

"source code, also called assembly lancontains mnemonic abbreviations for each step and can be read by expert

programmers. Once a programmer has access to the source code of a program, he is
able to determine the construction of the program and write his own version." Id. at
1303 n.4.
233 See id. at 1306.
Id. at 1307.
25 See Todd H. Flaming, The National Stolen Property Act
and Computer Files: A
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Court's opinion in Dowling is devoted specifically to that issue.236 The
Court identified the issue as "whether the statute reached the interstate
transportation of 'bootleg' phonorecords, (which were) 'stolen, converted, or taken by fraud' only in the sense that they were manufactured
and distributed without the consent of the copyright owners,"2 7 thus
immediately focusing its attention on the conduct-whether unauthorized
use of copyrighted material amounted to theft, conversion or fraudulent
taking-rather than on a definition of property.
In identifying the elements of the statute, the Court carefully distinguished between the requirement of transportation of goods, wares, or
merchandise (which "Dowling does not contest" )239 and the requirement
that the goods be "stolen, converted, or taken by fraud," the element on
which Dowling's appeal focused. 2 3 9 The Court reiterated that:
there is no dispute ... that Dowling's (conduct) ... constituted infringement of those copyrights. It is less clear, however, that the
taking that occurs when an infringer arrogates the use of another's
protected work comfortably fits the terms associated with physical
removal employed by § 2314 .. . The infringer invades a statutorily
defined province guaranteed to the copyright holder alone. But he
does not assume physical control 24over the copyright nor does he
wholly deprive its owner of its use. 0

This language strongly suggests that the problem in Dowling was
not the type of property involved, but the fact that the property-tangible
or intangible-had not been "stolen, converted, or taken by fraud."
Dowling had not taken anything, but had instead infringed on the rights
of the copyright owner. Seen in that light, Dowling would permit prosecution under § 2314 of the theft, or taking, of computer data, so long as
the conduct could be shown to be theft or taking, rather than the infringement of copyright.
The Brown court clearly did not view Dowling from this perspective. In Brown, the court repeatedly referred to the intangibility of the
"property" as the dispositive factor:
Dowling holds that § 2314 applies only to physical 'goods, wares or

merchandise.' Purely intellectual property is not within this category.
It can be represented physically, such as through writing on a page,
New Form of Property, a New Form of Theft, 1993 U. CHI. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 255

(advocating this view).
236 See Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 218-27 (1985) (addressing exclusively the subject of copyright infringement, not the definition of "property" or "goods,
wares, and merchandise.").
237 Id. at 208.

238 Id. at 214.
239 Id.

240 Id. at 217.
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but the underlying, intellectual property itself, remains intangible ....
We hold that the computer program itself is an intangible
intellectual property, and as such, it alone cannot constitute goods,
wares, merchandise, securities or moneys which have been stolen,
converted or taken within the meaning of §§ 2314 or 2315.241

The dismissal in Brown could, perhaps, have been affirmed on the
ground that the indictment alleged, and the government's proffered evi-

dence might have shown, a copyright infringement and not a theft, conversion, or taking of the source code. The indictment specifically described the source code, and the program for which it contained
instructions, as the "exclusive property" of the employer; 242 the defendant argued that the indictment actually alleged conduct amounting to infringement on intellectual property rights, not theft; 243 and the Tenth Circuit's opinion suggests that the prosecution's case might indeed be so
described. 244 Thus, the Brown court could have viewed the case as an
attempt to punish copyright infringement and, citing language in Dowling, found § 2314 an inappropriate vehicle for that purpose. Although
that possibility was open to it, Brown clearly rests squarely on the notion
that § 2314 applies only to physical property, and not to intellectual
property such as computer codes.
'245
The court in United States v. Riggs, however, took quite a different view of Dowling and the scope of § 2314. The case was among the
first prosecutions resulting from the "hacker crackdown" of the late
1980s,2 46 and is still regarded as significant by the computer community.
Riggs reflects quite graphically the clash of competing interests in cyberspace, most notably the clash between the telephone industry and hackers. 247
The indictments against Riggs and co-defendant Niedorf arose from
the unauthorized copying and publication of a document owned by BellSouth, one of the regional Bell operating companies, 2481 containing infor241

United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301, 1307-08 (10th Cir. 1991).

242 See id. at 1303 n.5.

See id. at 1303.
244 According to the court, the prosecution attempted to distinguish Dowling primarily
on the grounds that the source code here took 15 years to develop, and that the code was
"removed from things that the victim thought they had protected." Id. at 1305.
245 739 F. Supp. 414 (N.D. IlW.1990).
24 See supra note 20; see also Dorothy E. Denning, United States v. Craig
Neidorf: A
Debate on Electronic Publishing, Constitutional Rights, and Hacking, 34 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 24 (1991); also available on-line at <http://www.eff.org>.
247 For a fascinating account of the events surrounding
the Riggs case, see STERLING,
supra note 23. See also Barlow, supra note 14; Cutrera, supra note 16; Denning, supra
note 246.
248 The regional Bell companies were formed in 1984 as the result of federal anti-trust
243
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mation about the operation of its "enhanced 911" system for handling
emergency calls. In December 1988, Riggs gained unauthorized access
to a BellSouth computer system in Atlanta,

49

downloaded the text of the

"E911" document, and sent it by modem to Niedorf in Missouri. Niedorf subsequently published a modified copy of the document in his online newsletter "Phrack," which was available on various hacker bulletin
boards around the country. During the law enforcement raids comprising
Operation Sun Devil in February 1990-over a year following Riggs's
downloading of the document, and eleven months after the publication of
the revised copy in Phrack, but only days after the telephone system
crash of Martin Luther King Day-Riggs and others, eventually including Niedorf, were arrested, their equipment confiscated, and prosecutions
against them commenced.
Riggs and Niedorf were indicted for trafficking in information that
would permit unauthorized access to computers under § 1030(a)(6), 250
wire fraud under § 1343, and interstate transportation of stolen property
under § 2314. Riggs, who had obtained a copy of the document by
means of unauthorized access, pleaded guilty to wire fraud 2512
charges.
litigation.
9 The security system was so lax that not even a password was required
to gain access. Cf Michael Godwin, Some 'Property' Problems in a Computer Crime Prosecution,
16 CARDOZO L. FORuM 24 (1992); BellSouth improved its security measures as a result
of Riggs's access. See Denning, supra note 246, at 29.
M The charges under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(6) were dropped in a superseding
indictment, apparently because the E911 document did not in fact provide information that
would facilitate unauthorized access to any computer; the document merely described the
operation of the system. See Denning, supra note 246, describing specifically the information contained in the E911 document.
251 The basis of the fraud counts was that Riggs had made use of an account assigned
to a BellSouth employee, and, in that sense, had misrepresented himself to be that em-

plogee.

Riggs's sentencing raised other interesting questions. The district court ordered,
inter alia, that Riggs was not to "own personally or directly have control over a computer
of any type for [his] own personal use during the period of supervised release." See
United States v. Riggs, 967 F.2d 561, 563 (11th Cir. 1992). On appeal of that sentencing
condition, Riggs argued, in an amicus brief filed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation,
that that condition amounted to an infringement of his First Amendment rights.
The order did not simply prohibit particular illegal uses of a computer, the brief
pointed out, but the use of a computer for any purpose, including the exercise of rights of
speech and association. Particularly for a computer-literate person like Riggs, such a
prohibition seriously curtailed his ability to communicate. The EFF noted that an analogous (although less restrictive) limitation on the use of mails by a person convicted of
mail fraud was struck down, precisely on First Amendment grounds, in United States v.
Holloway, 740 F.2d 1373 (6th Cir. 1984).
To impose an even harsher prohibition against the use of a computer would thus appear also to be unconstitutional; only if, somehow, computers themselves were dangerous
instruments like firearms, could Riggs's sentence be valid. Amicus brief, United States v.
Riggs <http://www.eff.org> (copy on file with author). The Eleventh Circuit declined
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Niedorf, however, contested the charges against him, on a variety of
constitutional, statutory, and factual grounds.
In denying Niedorfs motion to dismiss, 253 the court addressed the
applicability of § 2314 to physical property.2 54 Niedorf argued, as summarized by the court, that "the only thing which he allegedly caused to
be transferred across state lines was 'electronic impulses' . . . [and that]
electronic impulses do not constitute 'goods, wares, or merchandise.'"

The court flatly rejected that argument:
Niedorf's conduct is not properly characterized as the mere transmission of electronic impulses. Through the use of his computer, Niedorf allegedly transferred proprietary business information. . . . The
question ...

is not whether electronic impulses are 'goods, wares, or

merchandise' within the meaning of § 2314, but whether the proprietary information contained in ... the E911 file constitutes
a 'good,
256
ware, or merchandise within the purview of that statute.

Noting that "[n]o court has ever held that the electronic transfer of
confidential, proprietary business information from one computer to another across state lines constitutes a violation of § 2314, ,21 the Riggs
court proceeded to reach precisely that conclusion. Other courts had
found that proprietary information, when "affixed to some tangible medium, such as a piece of paper, " 258 became "goods, wares, or merchandise." In view of that "well-settled" proposition, a short step would
produce the same conclusion regarding intangible information "affixed to
to address the issue, holding that no effective timely objection was raised before the district court. See Riggs, 967 F.2d at 563. Similar conditions have been imposed on other
cases. Such restrictions make sense, and indeed are constitutionally permitted, only if
computers are regarded not as tools for communication, but as dangerous instruments in
themselves; only if the computer itself rather than conduct is regarded as the focus of the
criminal law.
253 The court's decision of June 5, 1990, comprises the denial of the
motion to dismiss
the original indictment; a superseding indictment was returned only days after the court's
decision. See United States v. Riggs, 739 F. Supp. 414 (N.D. Ill. 1990). Niedorf subsequently moved to dismiss the superseding indictment as well; that motion was denied.
See 743 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. Ill. 1990). The later decision did not provide a detailed
analysis of the § 2314 charges, relying instead on the analysis set forth in the earlier
opinion. See 743 F. Supp. at 557-58, 561.
In denying Niedorf's motion to dismiss the charges under § 1343, the court expressly found that the information contained in the E911 document, although "obtained"
in electronic form only (and apparently never reproduced by either defendant in any form
other than electronic), constituted "property" within the meaning of that statute. See
Riggs, 739 F. Supp. at 418-19. "The property which forms the basis for a wire fraud or
mail fraud charge can be 'intangible' property." Id. at 419 n.7.
255 Id. at 420.
256 Id.

257 Id. at 419.
25 Id. at 420-21.
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a floppy disk.",259 "The court sees no reason to hold differently simply
because Niedorf stored the information inside computers instead of
printing it out on paper. In either case, the information is in a transferable, accessible, even salable form." 260 The computer itself, the court in
effect held, was legally irrelevant;
the only legal question was whether
26
the conduct amounted to a crime. 1
Moreover, the court expressed doubt that "tangibility is a requirement of 'goods, wares, or merchandise' under § 2314" in any event;
and, even if it were, information stored in a computer was as "tangible"
as information written on paper. 262 To the Riggs court, the key statutory
issue was not tangibility, but accessibility: "The accessibility of the information in readable form from a particular storage place also makes the
information tangible, transferable, salable and, . . . brings it within the
definition of 'goods, wares, or merchandise' under § 2314." 263 In a
sense, then, the tangibility, or accessibility, of the storage place makes
the information stored there equally tangible. To the Riggs court, computer data are therefore "goods, wares, or merchandise," and come
within the scope of § 2314.
The Riggs court distinguished Dowling as a case about copyright infringement, not about the definition of "goods, wares, or merchandise."
Unlike the holder of a copyright, "[t]he owner of confidential, proprie259 Riggs, 739 F. Supp. at
421.
260 Id.
261 This conclusion, never explicitly stated by the court, is one of the central theses of

this article, and implies a broad range of consequences for the law of "computer crime."
Specifically regarding Niedorf's situation, that conclusion has other significant ramifications. Niedorf published a newsletter. That the newsletter was published only in electronic form should be, consistent with the thrust of Riggs, irrelevant: Niedorf should
have been entitled to the same First Amendment protections granted to any publisher.
But he was not. Not only did Secret Service agents seize the allegedly "stolen" E911
document; they seized all of his equipment and prevented him from continuing to publish
altogether.

As John Perry Barlow put it, "If the 911 document had been the Pentagon Papers
(another proprietary document) and Phrack the New York Times, a completion of the
analogy would have seen the government stopping publication of the Times and seizing
its every material possession, from notepads to presses." Barlow, supra note 14, at 5051. Riggs should have been entitled to the same Fourth Amendment protections granted

to any citizen. But he was not. Again, in Barlow's words, "lilt's quite as if the government could seize your house simply because a guest left a stolen VCR in an upstairs bed-

room closet."

Id. at 51. The actions of the Secret Service in connection with the arrest,

search and seizure in Riggs should have compelled the dismissal of all charges on First

and Fourth Amendment grounds; only if the court regarded the computer itself as a dangerous instrument, and utterly unlike other kinds of property, could those actions pass
constitutional muster. See id.
262 See Riggs, 739 F. Supp at 421, 422.

263 Id. at 422.
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tary business information .... possesses2 64something which has clearly
been recognized as an item of property."
Brown, relying on language from Dowling, in turn rejected the
Riggs analysis:
We feel that the Riggs interpretation of the statute is in error in light
of the Supreme Court's focus on 'physical goods, wares, or merchandise' that have themselves been 'stolen, converted, or taken by
fraud' ..... The element of physical
265 'goods, wares, and merchandise' in §§ 2314 and 2315 is critical.
The Brown court focused on the "physical" aspect, and read Dowling as excluding non-physical items such as computer data from the scope
of § 2314. The Riggs court read Dowling simply as rejecting the use of §
2314 as a copyright enforcement tool, not as establishing a definition of
"goods, wares, or merchandise;" that reading would permit the use of §
2314 in a computer-related prosecution, so long as the computer data
could be shown to have been "stolen, converted, or taken by fraud."
It is submitted here that Brown's reading makes little sense and is
probably inaccurate. Dowling did not explicitly hold that only tangible,
physical objects are within the scope of § 2314; to the extent that Brown
assumes such an explicit holding, it rests on a shaky foundation. Dowling did, explicitly and repeatedly, focus on the conduct at issue there and
squarely held that infringement of copyrights is not equivalent to the
theft, conversion, or fraudulent taking required by the statute. That focus of the Dowling court, relied upon by Riggs, seems to have been regarded as merely peripheral to the reasoning in Brown.
Moreover, to hold, as did Brown, that § 2314 applies to physical
"goods" but not to intangibles such as computer data, leads to the conclusion that § 2314 would apply to the transportation of, e.g., proprietary
information such as a chemical formula written on a stolen piece of pa266
per, but not to a chemical formula written on one's own paper or computer disk. That conclusion reflects a triumph of formalized hair-splitting
over common sense. If the intellectual property is proprietary, and if it
has been "stolen, converted or taken by fraud," then the plain language
of § 2314 appears irresistibly to apply. Whether the information is written on a piece of paper or on a computer disk is a difference without any
distinction; it is a detail that cannot sensibly be said to separate criminal
conduct from non-criminal.

264

265
266

Id. at 423 (citing Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987)).
United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301, 1308-09 (10th Cir. 1991).
See id. at 1307-08 n.14.
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As the Riggs court pointed OUt, 267 the Brown view would deem
criminal the printing out of unlawfully obtained proprietary information
from a computer to paper, but would find the storage alone on a computer of such information non-criminal. The Brown view focuses on the
technology itself-the means-rather than on the result or the conduct.
If § 2314 prohibits transportation of stolen intellectual property, then the
precise technological form in which that property is stored or transported
should not be used to obscure the point of the statute or to undermine its
purpose. The use of a computer should not be the determining factor as
to whether conduct is or is not criminal.
The difficulty in Riggs was not that the E911 document did not,
somehow, comprise "goods, wares, or merchandise." Plainly, it did;
and it did whether it happened to appear in printed form or in other easily reproducible form. The problems, instead, were factual: (1) the
document did not consist of proprietary information, and (2) its value
was so insignificant as to fall beneath the scope of the statute. 268 Those
facts probably should have precluded any prosecution in the first place;
the fact that the information was stored electronically, however, should
not have compelled any particular legal conclusion.
Similarly, in United States v. Jones,
another early computerrelated prosecution, defendant was convicted under § 2314 for transporting fraudulently obtained property across state lines. The defendant received checks from a corporation after her cohort, an employee of the
corporation, had used a computer to set up a bogus account payable. The
Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the indictment, and found that
267
268

See Riggs, 739 F. Supp. at 421.
The document, repeatedly described by prosecutors both prior to and at trial as

having been closely safeguarded and valued by a prosecution witness at $80,000, was in
fact publicly available from a regional Bell publications office for $13.
The publiclyavailable document actually contained more and more specific information than did the
version published electronically by Niedorf. See Denning, supra note 246, at 29;
STERLING, supra note 23, at 265-67. Those facts, disclosed during cross-examination to
the great surprise of the BellSouth witness, resulted in the voluntary dismissal of the
prosecution against Niedorf; they certainly reflect the overzealousness of the prosecution
of Riggs and Niedorf and the almost comical lack of preparation, perspective, and proportion on the part of the government and BellSouth. Assistant U.S. Attorney William J.
Cook, in announcing the dismissal of the charges against Niedorf, stated that: "The
value of the document was one of the factors in the prosecution. There were aspects of
this document that we did not know were in the public domain. It was a question of the
way the phone company portrayed the document."
U.S. Drops Charges Against UM
Hacker, ST. Louis PosT-DIsPATcH, July 28, 1990, at 4B. Niedorf's attorney, Sheldon
Zenner, more bluntly observed that "the government accepted lock, stock, and barrel
everything that BellSouth told them without an independent assessment." Michael Alexander, Dial 1-800... for Bellsouth 'Secrets,' COMpUTERWORLD, Aug. 6, 1990, at 8
(quoting Sheldon Zenner).
553 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1977).
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Jones's scheme was an "indictable offense" under § 2314.270 The use of
the computer there was no more than a detail; the defendant had simply
come up with a fairly clever (but not clever enough), "high-tech" means
of committing fraud. Although Jones has been held out as an example
warranting the enactment of computer-specific statutes, 271 in fact that case
was, and should have been, prosecuted successfully as a fraud committed
in a somewhat unusual manner. The simpler, more general statute
worked effectively.
B.

"Property": A Definitional Problem That Isn't

The major apparent difficulty in applying general criminal statutes,
such as § 641 (theft of government money, records, or "thing[s] of
value") or § 1343 (wire fraud) or § 2314 (interstate transportation of
stolen property), to computer-related conduct arises from the nature of
computer data, and specifically from the notion of computer data as
"property" or a "thing of value" within the meaning of those statutes.
The House Report accompanying the original 1984 legislation specifically
noted that problem:
Experts told the Committee that we need to shift attention in our statutes from concepts such as 'tangible property' and credit and debit
instruments to concepts of 'information' and 'access to information.' ~272coigwtabsarsbeae
.7...Difficulties in coping with computer abuse arise because
much of the property involved does not fit well into categories of
property subject to abuse or theft; a pro
2 ram, for example, may exist
only in the form of magnetic impulses.
The allied problem, noted the Report, also arises from the nature of
computer data and computer transactions: "When a program of substantial commercial value is misappropriated, the person from whom it is
stolen almost always remains in possession of the original. Indeed, the
original program may not have been moved so much as a single inch
while being illicitly copied. " 2 7 4 These difficulties led the Report directly
to its central conclusion: "It is obvious that traditional theft/larceny
statutes are not the proper vehicle
to control the spate of computer abuse
275
and computer assisted crimes."
It is true that the electromagnetic impulses that comprise computer
data do not "fit well" within the idea of "property" if that idea is re270

271
272
273

See id. at 353.
See Roddy, supra note 32, at 353-54.
H.R. REP. No. 98-894 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.A.A.N. 3689, 3690.
Id. at 3695.

Id.
275 Id.
274
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stricted to the ancient common-law paradigm of one's neighbor's livestock. When the old common law conceptions of larceny, and fraud
arose, the notion of intangible property was utterly outside the realm of
social or legal experience. By the late twentieth century, however, intangible "things" made possible by technology have long since become
an unremarkable aspect of daily life. The law has developed ample
precedent for addressing problems raised by property that "does not fit
well" with traditional notions of property. That body of precedent affords adequate means of addressing criminal conduct involving computer
technology. Wholly new legislation, focused on specific technology, is
not necessary.276
Indeed, the House Report itself, after identifying the definition of
property as a central reason for enacting computer-specific legislation,
made reference to an obvious non-computer-specific solution: defining
property "to include277electronically processed or stored data, either tangible or intangible."
Thus, one legislative response to computer-related crime is to redefine "property" or "thing of value" so as to include computer data.
Both the 1979 proposed statute 2 and a proposed 1985 amendment to the
CFAA would have produced precisely that result. 2 79 By thus broadening
(or, perhaps more accurately, clarifying) the definitions of those central
terms, Congress could have made clear that the conduct of Langevin or
Seidlitz, z 8 ° constituted crimes under existing federal statutes of general
application, without the need for technology-specific laws. A definitional
solution would render the enactment of computer-specific statutes unnecessary.
C. Theft and Trespass: A Definitional Solution
As demonstrated earlier, numerous general criminal statutes can
serve effectively in computer-crime prosecutions. The traditional crimes
276 ' It's just like any other form of theft, except that it's more subtle and more sophisticated."
Mark Potts, 'Hacker' Pleads Guilty in AT&T Case, WASH. POST, Mar. 23,
1991, at Al (quoting Assistant U.S. Attorney Geoffrey R. Garinther, prosecutor in United
States v. Rose).
277 H.R. REP. No. 98-894 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.A.A.N. 3689, 3695.
278 See S. 240, 96th Cong., (1977).
279 See S. 1678, introduced in September 1985, that would have defined "property" to

include "financial instruments or information, including electronically processed or produced data and computer programs in either machine or human readable form; computer

services; and any other tangible or intangible item of value." This definition, as well as
other portions of the bill, was in need of some revision. The basic thrust of its definition
of "property" to include computer data, however, could have facilitated the application of
general criminal statutes to the computer setting.
280 See supra notes 68-73.
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of theft and trespass deserve particular attention. The unauthorized transfer or copying of data could fall within the proscriptions of a larceny
statute. By defining property to encompass computer data, a legislature
could effectively prohibit such conduct as the taking of the property of
another with the intent to deprive the owner.
A scheme to "steal" computer time and storage capacity was prosecuted successfully under 18 U.S.C. § 641 (theft, conversion, or embezzlement of government property) in United States v. Sampson. 28' The
defendants, employees of a government contractor, used for their own
purposes the government-owned computers assigned to them for their
jobs. Charged with theft, they argued that computer time and capacity
did not constitute property within the meaning of the statute. This argument is strongly reminiscent of the argument used to support the enactment of § 1030: that computer functions do not correspond to the familiar legal concepts associated with property. Indeed, Sampson's argument
appears to carry even more weight, because his conduct involved only the
use of the computer's capacity, not the transfer or alteration of data;
Congress's concern, in enacting § 1030, was that information-the electronic impulses that comprise computer data-could not easily be classified as property. Yet those electronic impulses surely correspond to the
notion of property more easily than the "philosophical concepts " 2 82 of
time and capacity at issue in Sampson. Nevertheless, the court there held
that
[t]he consumption of [the computer's] time and the utilization of its
capacities seem to the court inseparable from the physical identity of
the computer itself.... [Tihe uses of the computer . . appear to the
court to be a 'thing of value' within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §2 8641,
3
sufficient upon which to predicate a legally sufficient indictment.

Thus, even where the property was considerably less tangible than
in most computer prosecutions, the traditional law of theft applied.
Another very early computer-crime case provides further illustration
both of the problem of "property" in relation to computers, and of a
Ward v. Superior
graceful and effective solution of that problem.
284
decided under California state law, squarely presented the
Court,
question of whether computer2 86 data ("impulses")285 constituted an
"article" under the trade secret or theft
statutes. In Ward, the de281 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. 879 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
282

See id. at 880.

283 Id.
284
285

3 Computer L. Serv. Rep. 206 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972).
See id. at 208.

286 See id. (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 499c (prohibiting the stealing,

taking or carry-

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[27:574

fendant had accessed without authorization proprietary computer information, downloaded it onto his own computer, and subsequently printed
out a hard copy of the data. The court denied a motion to dismiss only
because the defendant had printed out a "tangible" copy of the informa288
The electronic impulses transferred by telephone and modem
tion.
were held explicitly to be "not tangible and hence do not constitute an
'article"' within the meaning of the trade-secret statute. 28 9 The crucial
word "article" was statutorily defined as an "object, material, device or
substance or copy thereof, including any writing, record, recording,
drawing, sample, specimen, prototype, model, photograph, microorganism, blueprint or map." 29 Reasoning that "[a]ll of the foregoing
things are tangible and under the principle of ejusdem generis, telephonic
29 1
impulses would not constitute an article representing a trade secret[,]"
the court rejected the argument that taking and carrying away computer
data amounted to theft.
This decision could well be taken as support for the view that only
computer-specific statutes, not statutes of general application, would be
effective in combating this type of conduct. The court's opinion, however, offers support for the opposite view. First, of course, the court
could have read more expansively the statutory definition itself ("or substance or copy thereof") so as to include a computerized copy as the
"substance or copy" of the trade secret. More generally, however, because the court relied so heavily on the precise language of the statute, a
simple amendment to the statutory definition would have compelled the
opposite outcome. If the legislature had chosen to include in that definition an explicit reference to computer data, or computer-generated copies
or representations, the statute would have encompassed Ward's conduct,
without the need for an entirely new, computer-specific statute. If his
conduct amounted to the theft of a trade secret, it could then have been
prosecuted under the trade-secret statute.
Similarly, intentionally gaining unauthorized access to information
could fall within the scope of a traditional trespass statute (unlawfully
entering the property of another), if the definition of property under that
statute explicitly included a computer, computer program, or computer
system. The essence of trespass, unlawful entry, corresponds quite
neatly to the unauthorized accessing of electronic property. The 1985
ing away of any article representing a trade secret)).
See id. at 211 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 487).
8
288 See id. at 208-09.
289 See Ward, 3 Computer L. Serv. Rep. at 208.
290 Id.
291 Id.
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proposed amendment to the CFAA, 2 which included a provision punishing "[w]hoever intentionally without authorization obtains access to a
computer or a computer system or computer network," was presented to
the Congress with this explanation:
The conduct proscribed in [this section] is akin to a trespass onto
someone else's property. A person who rummages through the information contained in a computer... causes the same harm as an
intruder who clandestinely enters a person's home to look
293through the
contents of the owner's personal records and documents.
The key to that analogy is its focus on "harm." The harm caused
by an intrusion into one's home corresponds closely to the harm caused
by an intrusion into one's computer. The details of the conduct, of
course, are quite different; the means by which the intrusion is effected is
vastly different. The harm, however, is the same, and can be addressed
legislatively in much the same way. Far from supporting the computerspecific CFAA, that legislative history supports precisely the opposite
conclusion: that unauthorized access of a computer is much like unauthorized access of real property, and could be prosecuted under a trespass
statute.
By using traditional criminal statutes, most notably trespass and larceny, and by redefining property to include computer data, legislatures
could avoid the problems of redundancy, overbreadth, and imprecision
inherent in computer-specific legislation. That approach, both simple and
effective, could avoid the problem of ever-changing technology and make
use of established precedent. Reliance on traditional statutes fosters a
legislative focus on harmful results, rather than on the use of technology
itself.
CONCLUSION

The criminal law is, and should be, concerned with punishing or
deterring harmful conduct. In the area of computer crime, as in every
other area of the criminal law, the legislative focus should remain on that
important goal. To the extent that lawmakers turn their attention to computers rather than to harmful conduct, they are distracted from their
proper role.
By enacting computer-specific criminal statutes, legislators encourage prosecutors, the public, and themselves to think in terms of technology rather than conduct. Such statutes suggest that it is the use of tech-

292 See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
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nology itself, rather than the causation of harm, that must be punished or
deterred.
By relying instead on criminal statutes of more general application,
legislators can prohibit harmful conduct whether accomplished with a
computer or not. Rather than being frightened or seduced into punishing
the use of the computer, lawmakers can properly return their focus to the
prevention of criminal conduct.

